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Abstract
Over the past fifty or so years, American society has endured overwhelming
changes, affecting nearly all aspects of life. A new set of values emerged and families
began adopting more liberal mindsets, leading to an increase in the divorce rate. The first
aim of this study is to explain the social, macro-level causes of divorce. Literature on the
1960s identifies these influences as the importance of “the self”, feminism, birth control,
no-fault divorce laws, and religious teachings. Further, I use data from the General Social
Survey to determine whether micro-level factors influence an individual’s risk of divorce,
both during this revolution and in the present-day. Regression models examine the impact
of these variables on divorce trends, and a series of interaction tests measure whether
these effects have changed over time.
Findings indicate that variables such as education and income have an effect on
an individuals’ risk of divorce. Yet, many of these results become insignificant with the
introduction of other controls, such as those for religion, which change once participation
is controlled for. Although analyses of these variables reveals that they cannot fully
explain the trend of divorce, macro-level variables set the groundwork for an ideological
revolution and micro-level variables help represent the populations most affected by
divorce. Since attributes and values cannot be credited with the divorce rate, future
studies should attempt to identify the variables that affect the risk of divorce on a societal
level.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review
The 20th century witnessed societal and ideological changes that affected all facets
of life. In addition to industrialization, scientific discovery, and the start of globalization,
the 20th century was a time of social change, moving away from many traditional values
and towards a more independent, liberated mindset. Institutions such as marriage were
impacted greatly as early as 1920, when the divorce rate nearly doubled from 4.0
divorces per every 1,000 existing marriages in 1900, to 7.7 divorces per every 1,000
existing marriages 20 years later (O’Neil 1967:20). Though surprising, these numbers
failed to truly capture the imminence of the divorce revolution, both statistically and in
terms of values (Riley 1991).
During the earlier years of the 20th century, the American family adhered to a very
strict, stable Western ideology: a patrilineal, religious, close-knit system containing “the
source of economic stability and educational, and vocational training” (O’Neil 1967:2).
Men were the breadwinners and worked long, hard hours to provide for their families,
while women stayed at home, raised the children and remained dependent on their
husbands for support (Cherlin 2009). Marriage represented one of the most fundamental
institutions of society in Western culture (Cherlin 2009). During the 1950s, American
laws and social expectations had changed little since the mid 1800s (Cherlin 2009). The
notion of male-dominated households was reaffirmed and reinforced through the law,
such as the representation of husbands and wives composing of “a single person,
represented by the husband” in legal proceedings (Schwartz and Han 2014:607).
Individual freedom for women within their marriages was also not given, out of fear for
damaging “domestic harmony” (Cherlin 2009:85).
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Although it was indeed possible to obtain a divorce during this time, the
dissolution of marriage was seen as a betrayal of one’s vows. Moral and legal agendas
shaped the framework for both marriage and divorce, such as legally enforced financial
support intended to discourage separation. In essence, marriage provided a foundation for
one’s place in society and obtaining a divorce meant proving that one spouse “had
committed a serious breach of marital behavior” (Cherlin 2009:85). Halem (1980)
describes how clerical authorities, civil authorities and the bulk of society viewed
divorce: “the fear that divorce, by dissolving the family unit, jeopardizes fundamental
values essential to the well-being of individuals in society” (9). Given the importance of
the roles of marriage and the traditional family unit in life, it was believed that society
would be obliterated with the rejection of customary values and the rise of divorce.
Therefore, the best way to protect the bond of marriage was to restrict access to its
dissolution (Weitzman 1985).
By the second half of the 20th century, a new kind of American family emerged. It
was more private, secular, and able to take on the changes and challenges brought on by
the Industrial Revolution, WWII, and other events of that time (Halem 1980). Although it
had been on the rise in past years, the divorce rate skyrocketed in the years immediately
following WWII and then again in the early 1970s (Schwartz and Han 2014). A practice
that received such intense rejection and societal control just a few decades earlier had
become an integral part of American life. Through identifying the events that occurred
during these periods of time, we may subsequently determine how the development of
these ideologies altered traditional American values. One of the most significant
increases in the divorce rate took place during a time of pivotal change for American
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society. Herman (1992) describes the 1960s as “that period of social upheaval and
national self-examination that has been made into an island of time” (87). The grueling
aftermath of WWII and the Vietnam War left Americans with a need for change (Morgan
1991; Herman 1992). Post-war attitudes played a large role in explaining why the nation
was so vulnerable at the time. It is my hope that analyses focusing on the ideologies of
this period will provide insight into how social patterns affected the institution of
marriage.
In recent years, the divorce rate has leveled off, but it is nowhere near where it
was at the start of the 20th century. Conducted in 2006, one study on the role of timing in
divorce found that, for those aged 20-24, the divorce rate has generally declined (Shoen
and Canudas-Romo 2006:753). For those aged 25 and older during 2006, the divorce rate
goes slightly upward with some fluctuations (Shoen and Canudas-Romo 2006:753).
Although the divorce rate experienced an initial increase around the time of the midcentury, it had plateaued by the start of the 20th century and continues to do so today.
This suggests that the values introduced during that time have not vanished, but have less
dramatic (yet not negligible) effects on modern day society. The first aim of this paper is
to identify the kinds of ideologies that influenced these behavioral changes, followed by
an analysis of how these ideologies continue to affect divorce on the micro-level today.
Macro-Level Factors
The 1960s present a variety of ideologies that may be credited with the
development of fundamental societal changes. These include: the prioritization of the
individual, feminism and the entrance of women in the workforce, the increasing
acceptance of birth control, legal divorce reform, religious affiliation and religious

	
  

	
   3	
  

teachings. While these are discussed separately in further detail below, it is clear that they
are linked in a more complex system of interpretation.
One of the most influential ideological changes that took place during the 1960s
was the emergence of humanistic psychology (Herman 1992). The consequences of the
Vietnam War left Americans with a motivation to implement social change; this
movement was characterized by two traits, “a growing radical awareness of society’s
deeply rooted resistance to change, coupled with activists’ still confident commitment to
bring about change” (Morgan 1991:21). A key component to this ideology lay in the
emphasis placed on personal gain and improvement. But, this attention towards “the self”
contradicted some of the main foundations of marriage: “…the traditional law embodied
the partnership concept of marriage by rewarding sharing and mutual investments in the
marital community” (Wheeler 1974:374). Thus, the importance placed on personal
growth in the 1960s “require[d] a new kind of marriage of which each [person] feels
personally fulfilled” (Cherlin 2009:90). The idea of prioritizing one’s own desires and
life goals before the norm of getting married could hypothetically have had immense
effects on the dissolution of marriage.
Feminism may also be credited as a cause for social change (Halem 1980). The
1960’s represented, along with many other ideologies, the second wave of feminism
(Herman 1992). In relation to society, the experiences of women in America during this
period highlight how women’s rights have transformed the make-up of the family. Both
industrialization and World War II created a higher demand for women in the work force,
introducing women to the idea of economic independence. The slow removal of men and
women from their traditional roles allowed women to move away from the homemaker
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stereotype and take control of their lives. “This growing economic independence of
women and the demise of the self-sufficient household not only extricated women from
their traditional role as homemakers but provided an incentive to renounce their marital
responsibilities and to seek divorces” (Halem 1980:58). This particular section aims to
identify the extent to which women’s rights in the labor force and their entrance into the
educational system have affected the divorce rate.
In addition to these factors, the growing acceptance of birth control and other
contraceptives has theoretically had an effect on the original incentives for marriage.
These incentives depend on a division of labor that ensures interdependence (Yenor
2011). This divide is often placed along gender lines and is enforced through the ability
of women to reproduce (Yenor 2011). “Having children means conforming, to a degree,
to the reproductive cycle, which limits human freedom and…equality” (Yenor 2011:183).
Thus, the invention of birth control introduced women to the option of controlling
whether or not they become pregnant and, therefore, be forced into a particular role. This
freedom allowed women a certain degree of choice in determining the path that their lives
would take. However, given that these regulations previously provided couples with
motivations to get and stay married, I argue that the availability of this control has
eliminated the original incentives for marriage and lessened the consequences of divorce.
Placing attention towards the institution of marriage itself, one of the core driving
factors involved in marriage is religion.
“Religion provides moral principles about how family life should be lived, such
as the belief that adults should marry before having children. The law provides
principles about what is permissible and about what rights and obligations family
members have” (Cherlin 2009:33).
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Yet another possibility for the dissolution of marriage could thus be a potentially
decreasing religious population. With the modernization that took place in America
during this time, it seems logical that people would begin to reject religion and
spirituality. This was the case in Britain, when advancements in science lead to answers
to the questions for which people originally turned to religion (Cherlin 2009). In the
United States, modernization spurred the rejection of many religious norms, such as the
ability of women to be financially independent, which went against the traditional
formation that most families abided by (Cherlin 2009). Previously, religion gave families
a reason to stay together through trying times and many churches even shamed those who
chose to get a divorce. In the traditional Catholic view, even adultery was not justification
for divorce and in the traditional Jewish view, divorce was carried out in such a way that
the husband was given marital freedom while the wife was not (Cherlin 2009). Given the
increasing divorce rate and the events steering people away from religion, could it be that
a relationship exists between the divorce rate and American religious identity?
In addition to changing values, a number of studies have identified divorce reform
as playing a key role in the divorce rate (Wright and Stetson 1978; Nakonezny, Shull, and
Rodgers 1995; Vlosky and Monroe 2002). Until the 1970s, divorce laws were fault-based
and were granted strictly on the grounds of a few, specified situations. In this system,
spouses were labeled either “guilty” or “innocent” of committing a serious marital
offense such as adultery, cruelty or desertion (Wheeler, 1974:15; Weitzman, 1985:9;
Nakonezny et al. 1995:478). The implementation of the no-fault system began in 1970,
when California passed the first law terminating the necessity of fault in divorce
(Wheeler, 1974). By the late 1980’s, most states had passed some form of a no-fault
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reform (Nakonezny et al. 1995). These new, less restrictive laws made getting a divorce
much easier, yet whether they had any direct effect on the divorce rate is debatable
(Nakonezny et al. 1995). Statistics indicate that states with more lenient divorce laws do
have a higher rate of divorce than those with more restrictive laws (Nakonezny et al.
1995), but other factors must be taken into consideration before drawing a causal
connection, such as the possibility that these states passed no-fault reforms after the
divorce rate increased.
It will be the aim of this study to explain the extent to which the sudden increase
in divorce can be credited to these events and ideologies. In light of the variations within
the divorce rate towards the second half of the 20th century, statistics must be examined
within the context of their time. Social, political and ideological transformation
characterized America during both of these dramatic spikes, but this correlation does not
equal causation. Perhaps, by studying the institution of marriage through the framework
of macro-level influences on society, I will succeed in determining which societal trends
were present, how they affected American values, and the extent to which they continue
to affect society today.
Focus on “The Self”
The emergence of humanistic psychology in the social sciences represents the
craving of society to understand social interaction and individual experience, both of
which were previously considered to be private spheres (Herman 1992). One of the key
components of this new philosophy was the shift of focus on to “the self.” At the core of
these values lay the desire to separate oneself from the ills of society and focus on
physical and emotional enjoyment. Herman (1992) explains humanistic psychology
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within the context of the social, political and ideological upheaval taking place at the
time:
[In humanistic psychology,] “the most urgent human needs were to feel good
about oneself, experience one’s emotions directly, and grow emotionally, ‘the
self’ was inherently healthy and contained a kind of divine spark that moved the
human organism inexorably towards a process of growth and ‘becoming’; that
‘the self’s’ subjective experience was the highest authority; that scientific
commitment to objectivity was bankrupt and useless; in need of an infusion of
humanistic values” (Herman 1992:88).

In essence, this new ideology emphasized placing individual achievement, personal
responsibility, and self-improvement above all other obligations (Herman 1992; Cherlin
2009).
Traditionally, achievement and commitment were almost completely dependent
upon the family unit. Success and happiness were contingent upon the fulfillment of
marital vows, which consisted of a woman’s dedication to the home and children and a
man’s ability to provide a family with life’s necessities (Weitzman 1985). Since
happiness and success were based on things couples jointly produced instead of
individually, such as children and financial stability, Cherlin (2009) argues that it was
easier to find reasons to stay together. However, this altered mindset placed a new set of
goals on the horizon, none of which required the family unit to achieve.
Therefore, the question remains: does this focus on “the self” impact people’s
inclinations to get a divorce? If the commitments included in maintaining a marriage are
no longer in line with one’s personal goals, is that justification to end it? Marks (1986)
found that, when people enter into a relationship with personal “marriage agendas” and
have no motivations such as children to stay together, the force of their own concerns and
desires can “stretch a marriage precariously thin” (53). Yet this finding applies primarily
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to couples that enter marriage with previously conceived ideas and no children, making it
unrepresentative of the American population (Marks 1986).
On the other hand, Marks (1986) believes that marriage can provide a “safe
haven” where people may go to “retreat and get recharged, enabling them to return to the
all-important outside struggle with replenished vigor” (70). In this theory, individuals
appreciate marriage not within the context of responsibility, but as a personal refuge
away from the discomforts of life (Marks 1986). Marks identifies a number of potential
outcomes regarding the influence of the self on marital tendencies, many of which have
to do with the individual and their person agendas.
Cherlin (2009) maintains that this “expressive individualism” is not necessarily
incompatible with lifelong marriage, “but it requires a new kind of marriage in which the
spouses are free to grow and change and in which each person feels personally fulfilled”
(90). While preserving a relationship where both people place their personal goals ahead
of marital commitment may be unrealistic, it is possible given the right mindsets and
values (Cherlin 2009). What Cherlin (2009) introduces here is not a decline in the
institution of marriage, but a change in its construction.
The strength of this ideological revolution may, therefore, have been enough to
motivate some to accept divorce as an appropriate solution to their unhappy marriage
(Halem 1980). Whereas marriages were originally held together through factors such as
religious belief, public opinion, and economic dependence, the new ideas of romanticism,
individualism and happiness brought on by “the self” verified divorce as an adequate
option (Halem 1980).
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Feminism and the Entrance of Women into the Work Force
Many have cited women’s participation in the workforce as the cause for the
increased levels of divorce (Halem 1980; Yenor 2011). The ability of women to become
economically independent from men has eliminated one of the original and traditional
reasons for marriage: economic support. Yenor (2011) reasons that, faced with the
realistic option of supporting oneself and a child, women no longer feel the need to
commit to a man. This implies two possibilities, first, that women may be less likely to
get married in the first place, since they are free from the dependence previously imposed
upon them, and second, that the economic consequences of getting a divorce have been
significantly lessened, if not irrelevant, to the independent woman.
Traditional notions of marriage have depended on the separate identities of men
and women as the breadwinners and homemakers, respectively (Schwartz and Han 2014).
Schwartz and Han (2014) cite Becker’s (1974) exchange theory and suggest that, since
men have an advantage in the labor market and women in housework, “the gains to
marriage are maximized when high-wage men match with low-wage women, and thus
the risk of divorce is heightened when wives out earn their husbands” (607). Challenging
the balance of power within the family alters the benefits associated with gendered roles,
increasing the risk of divorce. This theory therefore believes that, through a woman’s
economic independence, gender specified roles lose their legitimacy and the rewards
originally associated with these roles are eradicated (Schwartz and Han 2014).
Similar to that theory, Rogers (2004) states that, the more independent a woman
becomes, the more likely she is to grow dissatisfied with her marriage. Economic
independence theory suggests that, as women become involved in the work force and are
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able to contribute more to the family income, they begin to perceive the division of labor
in the household as unequal (Rogers 2004). This growing resistance and the desire of
women to renegotiate household gender roles may be associated with marital conflict
(Rogers 2004). Therefore, an increase in wives’ income could not only provide them with
the resources to leave their marriages, but it also confirms their overall dissatisfaction
with traditional marriage arrangements (Rogers 2004).
Since about the 1980s, the divorce rate has leveled off. Given that many credit
this increase to women’s entrance into the work force, how can we understand this
relationship in light of those statistics? Rogers (2004) and Schwartz and Han (2014) both
explain the leveling out of divorce as a result of growing public acceptance. Rogers
(2004) cites role collaboration theory, which suggests that the risk of divorce is highest
when the wife’s income is very low or very high- suggesting that marriage stability is
strongest when perceptions of equality and a fair division of labor are perceived (Rogers
2004). In this theory, wives’ resources are a source of marital equality and power,
“increasing the likelihood that wives expect [and get] more equitable marital
relationships, which influences marital quality and stability” (Rogers 2004:62). If,
however, this power (or income) falls below or exceeds that of the husband’s, then this
balance is thrown off and the risk of divorce increases. This overall concept stems from
the necessity of public acceptance, since wives, equipped with the resources to support
themselves, are able to invest in and negotiate more equal and satisfying relationships
(Rogers 2004). In order for this to happen, a growing number of the male population
would need to accept these new gender roles and divisions of labor.
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Schwartz and Han (2014) further attribute this change to diffusion theory. This
theory suggests that the acceptance of a revolution begins slowly, but once a “critical
mass” has been reached, acceptance speeds up and results in a reduction of social costs
(Schwartz and Han 2014:610). Their study specifically focuses on the acceptance of
marriages in which wives have the educational advantage and reveals that these
marriages would initially be more likely than others to end in divorce (Schwartz and Han
2014). Since this theory is based upon the idea that marriages consisting of women that
do not adhere to traditional roles are more likely to divorce, these conclusions may also
apply to marriages in which women hold significant roles in the work force. As more
women enter the work force and the prevalence of these socially unaccepted, unstable
marriages increases, so does the divorce rate. However, according to diffusion theory,
individuals observe others forming these relationships and acceptance begins to increase,
resulting in a decline of the discomfort that initially led to divorce (Schwartz and Han
2014). Therefore, diffusion theory explains the relationship between the leveling off of
the divorce rate and women’s entrance into the work force in terms of how the population
has become more comfortable with a less traditional, more equal kind of relationship
(Schwartz and Han 2014). As the prevalence of these marriages rise, the divorce rate
levels off. This accounts for the fact that divorce saw an initial increase (when women’s
entrance into the work force was a new concept and not widely accepted by their male
partners, causing conflict within marriages) followed by a plateau (when the population
had more widely accepted women’s participation in the work force and the conflict
originally associated with it decreased).
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Birth Control and Contraception
The opportunity for women to control their fertility presented a major advance in
feminism during this time (Yenor 2011). Initially, the act of sex would typically have
resulted in pregnancy, causing women to become dependent on men for support. Sex was
used as a weapon to ensure the dependence of women and to “keep women in the posture
of defeat, a symbol of male dominance and immanence” (Yenor 2011:190). The chance
to avoid becoming pregnant through birth control and other forms of contraception
allowed women to separate maternity and dependence. Yenor (2011) explains the female
role through Marxism, comparing the male-headed households to the dominant class and
the housewives to the oppressed class. By forcing women to be economically dependent
on their husbands, the family enforces a system of exploitation upon women by their
husbands (Yenor 2011). Thus, Yenor (2011) highlights the importance that contraception
has played in women’s independence: “Women should be able to avoid pregnancy when
they have sex (for this, contraception and abortion), and they should be able to become
pregnant without being dependent on a man” (Yenor 2011:185). The goal to “divorce sex
and reproduction” is made possible for women by the option of choosing when they get
pregnant, if they get pregnant, and by whom (Yenor 2011:186).
Further, the ability of women to control their ability to reproduce has allowed sex
to become more of a free, independent act, unrestrained and unconnected to other aspects
of life (Yenor 2011). Yenor (2011) believes that marriage is a mundane, inconvenient
institution that becomes boring for both people when their mindsets and goals change
through time. Once sex was no longer associated with the commitment of a man and
woman to a child, it could remain “unconnected to other endeavors, following only the
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human will when and where it leads” (Yenor 2011:190). Thus, this theory holds that the
availability of contraceptives and birth control has affected the institution of marriage
and, now free of the obligations linked with children, the willingness to get a divorce.
Halem (1980) proposes conflict theory and suggests that the individual is in
constant conflict with the norms of society. The family is an inherently unstable unit, kept
together only by the “repression or sublimination of individual desires and internal
conflicts” (Halem 1980:97). Faced with the option of casual sex, the need of the
individual to exercise control and resist desire is eliminated, leading to the destruction of
marriage. Conflict theory therefore maintains that the glue holding a family together, or
the forced control of an individual to adhere to society’s notions of the family, has been
destabilized with the elimination of the need to repress one’s desires (Halem 1980).
Although Halem (1980) does not mention it, the idea that marriages function to control
the individual and inhibit their desires could also be a functionalist argument. Once these
particular and traditional notions of marriage became unnecessary, the functions of
marriage in society were weakened.
From Fault-Based to No-Fault Divorce
The second sharp increase in the divorce rate remains consistent throughout the
1970s (Shoen and Canudas-Romo 2006:753). During this time, the United States was in
the process of moving from a fault-based divorce system to a no-fault system. Divorce
reform has commonly been cited as another potential cause of the divorce revolution
(Wright and Stetson 1978; Nakonezny et al. 1995; Vlosky and Monroe 2002). While the
direct causation is debatable, the divorce reform no doubt made the process of getting a
divorce much easier and less psychologically painful to those involved (Nakonezny et al.
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1995). In the fault-based system, divorce was granted as a reward to the innocent party
and a punishment to the guilty party. Alimony, child support, and property distribution
were accordingly “awarded” to the innocent person and the quantity of economic
settlement was linked to the income of the guilty person (Nakonezny et al. 1995). Since
grounds for divorce were limited, couples pursuing divorce would fabricate evidence,
falsely accuse each other, and confess to things that never happened in an attempt to
prove fault (Weitzman 1985). The limiting nature of this system often ruined the
possibility of reconciliation and created an agenda of bitterness and conflict within the
process (Nakonezny et al. 1995; Weitzman, 1985). Therefore, the implementation of nofault divorce serves the purpose of “bring[ing] divorce legislation into line with the social
reality of marital breakdown as a more common and more acceptable event in
contemporary society” (Wheeler 1974:37).
Only a few years after California passed the first no-fault law, Wright and Stetson
(1978) argued that no-fault divorce was not to blame for the sudden increase in the
divorce rate. They concluded that, regardless of the effects of no-fault reforms on
individuals, they have nothing to do with the divorce rate (Wright and Stetson 1978).
However, this study is slightly outdated and I therefore question its validity.
On the other hand, Nakonezny et al. (1995) found that the switch from fault-based
divorce to no-fault divorce was responsible for the significant increase in the divorce rate.
This conclusion is supported through the use of a no-treatment group (or a control group),
which revealed an increase of .80 divorces for every 1,000 individuals per year in those
states that adopted no-fault divorce (Nakonezny et al. 1995:475). The reason for this
increase was simple: “provid[ing] a divorce law that makes divorce less restrictive by
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reducing the legal and the economic obstacles of divorce by abolishing the concept of
fault” (Nakonezny et al. 1995:487).
Wheeler (1974) and Riley (1991) agree with Wright and Stetson (1978) and
explain the divorce rate as a result of population growth and a heightened life expectancy
following WWII. After WWII, the population did experience a sudden and intense period
of growth, justifying Wheeler’s (1974) theory. Once “the ‘baby boom’ generation ha[d]
reached the age of marriage and divorce”, the divorce rate inevitably rose (Wheeler
1974:28). Given the fact that this generation came of age during the 1960s, they grew up
in an environment that perpetuated the new, radical ideals addressed in this paper. Riley
(1991) credits the divorce rate as being a consequence of the population’s extended life
expectancy, which was most likely caused by the scientific and technological
advancements of that time. Before WWII, people lived relatively shorter lives and
unhappy marriages would typically end with the death of one spouse (Riley 1991).
However, given this extended life span, many marriages had started lasting far longer.
Now faced with the option of ending their marriages all together, many Americans saw
divorce as an attractive solution (Riley 1991). The combination of divorce reform and a
longer life expectancy therefore work together to explain the heightened divorce rate
during this period.
Transformed Religious Teachings
During the 1950’s, religion played a significant role in shaping the American
family (Cherlin 2009). Church membership skyrocketed from 1850, when 34% of
Americans affiliated with a church, to 1950, when this number rose to 59% (Cherlin
2009:73). Involvement within a church meant taking part in activities that were geared
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towards the breadwinner/homemaker stereotypes of that time (Cherlin 2009). Many
religions, such as Catholicism and most Protestant denominations, would only allow a
divorce on the strict grounds of adultery or desertion and divorced church members were
often shamed into leaving (Cherlin 2009). Therefore, while religion played an undeniable
role in reinforcing the bond and structure of marriage before the social transformation of
the 1960’s, the questions of whether religion maintained this role after the 1960s, and to
what extent, remains.
The divorce rate, while stable during the years when people adhered to the 1950’s
American family structure, began to rise again in the early 1960’s, after WWII and during
the Vietnam War (Cherlin 2009). Seeing that religion placed such a strong emphasis on
the strength of marriage and the family, it would seem logical that, with a rise in the
divorce rate, American religiosity would experience a decrease. In addition, many of the
ideologies that emerged during the 1960’s had to do with individualism and selfexpression, concepts that went against some traditional, religious values (Cherlin 2009).
Rationally, advancements in globalization, modernization and ideology would represent a
decrease in religious vigor.
However, Americans have shown no such decrease in their affiliation with
religion (Cherlin 2009). Even though many American institutions were secularized
during this time, overall affiliation remained, as Cherlin (2009) explains, relatively
unchanged. In fact, “the strength of American religion is striking. In no other Western
country is religious practice so vital and so influential in shaping people’s beliefs”
(Cherlin 2009:33). The expectation that countries will become more secular as they
modernize and especially as new ideologies are introduced has been shockingly
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inaccurate when applied to the United States (Cherlin, 2009). Reasons for this religious
dedication are explained by Kent (1992) through social exchange theory. Kent (1992)
describes the 1960’s rise in religiosity as a way to “provide resolutions to crises of
meaning” and to allow a sense of order to social life (122). Faced with the fact that
movements in the 1960s were not all successful in initiating change, many activists
experienced a loss of hope and personal identity (Kent 1992). To deal with this
disappointment, many transformed themselves from activist to dedicated churchgoer,
turning to religion as a way to cut their losses, yet continue to remain within a group. But,
since a decline in American religiosity is not the answer to this disconnect, we are faced
with the question: how were people able to maintain their religious identities while
simultaneously accepting the collapse of marital status?
The answer lies in the changes that occurred not only in the values and style
characterizing religion during the mid-century, but also the ways in which religious
institutions reacted to the increasing divorce rate (Cherlin 2009). Cherlin (2009) outlines
how many religions transformed themselves by placing an increased emphasis on
personal growth and individual happiness. In the years preceding the ideological
revolution, the church discouraged divorce with a sharp rigor (Halem 1980). Efforts to
limit divorce included strict guidelines regarding qualifications as well as restrictions on
remarriage (Halem 1980). However, the second half of the 20th century saw many
religions change their ideology to fit a more liberal and individualist standpoint. For
example, American Catholics moved their emphasis away from the Church as an
institution and focused more on “individual responsibility for one’s faith, [through a]…
shift toward[s] viewing God as loving and forgiving rather than as punitive and
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judgmental, and they placed greater importance on personal exploration and discovery”
(Cherlin 2009:106). This previously mentioned ideal of “the self” allowed people the
option of finding happiness in relationships outside of those found through marriage
(Cherlin 2009). The church began to see marriage not through rules and tradition, but
through the potential growth and personal benefits that it could provide (Cherlin 2009).
The underlying explanation of how someone could maintain their religious
identity while diminishing one of its core traditional values therefore lies in the responses
of the church. With the divorce rate continuing to rise throughout the 1960s, 70s, 80s and
90s, many divorced individuals turned to their churches for solace and support (Cherlin
2009). In response, Mainline Protestant churches began allowing remarriage after any
form of divorce (Cherlin 2009:109), while Conservative Protestants centered their
divorce ideology towards helping divorced people heal (Cherlin, 2009). Catholics have
responded to the divorce rate by raising the rate of annulments, which is the only form of
divorce that they recognize (Cherlin 2009). On the other hand, many Evangelical
Christians began to focus their attention on encouraging couples to stay together by
intensifying the importance of marriage (Gushee 2008). Gushee (2008) recommends that
couples that are considering divorce should be offered tax cuts as a motivation to undergo
counseling. Throughout this variety of responses to the divorce rate, many religions that
initially centered their teachings on control have focused more attention on the
strengthening of marriage and continue this method today (Gushee 2008; Glass and
Levchak 2014). Thus, even through societal and ideological changes, religious affiliation
in America has remained relatively steady, a characteristic setting it apart from many
other developed countries (Cherlin 2009).
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In studying the relationship between divorce and religious transformation, it is
important to address the question of “which came first?” Did the divorce revolution occur
as a result of this alteration in religious teachings? Or did religion change its focus after
the divorce revolution began, as a way to accommodate those wishing to get a divorce
and maintain their religion? Questioning the direction of this relationship brings up a
number of differing theories, each of which aims to further explain the prevalence of
religion in America. Samenfink (1958) suggests a discrepancy between the teachings of
the Roman Catholic Church and the behavior of people who would consider themselves
to be “good” Roman Catholics (163). This disconnect exists specifically in teachings
regarding marital relations. At the time of this study, the Roman Catholic Church
maintained, first, that marriage was a sacramental act and second, that any “artificial
means” of preventing contraception were “sinful” (Samenfink 1958:164). Ultimately
Samenfink (1958) found “some indication that a hiatus did actually exists between what
these young people subscribed to in theory and carried out in practice” (163). The fact
that these “formal subscriptions” to religious teachings in marriage did exist during the
time of this study, yet were not always applied, suggests that, at least in the case of
Roman Catholics, certain values had yet to change (Samenfink 1958). This study
proposes that people started adhering to the American secular views of marriage on their
own, thus putting the divorce revolution before altered religious values (Samenfink
1958:163).
A contrasting perspective would suggest that religious transformation took place
before this revolution happened. Kent (1992) describes the religious transformation as
something that took place as a way for people to cope with the failure “to bring about the
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revolution by radical action” (129). As previously described, individuals turned to
religion partly because they needed a new technique to approach social change. This
viewpoint therefore suggests that religious transformation took place not as a response to
the divorce revolution, but as a new way to welcome social changes like it. “The
revolution would still come, but its arrival would be heralded by a personal
transformation of purified individuals” (Kent 1992:129). While this theory does not cite
the divorce revolution as a specifically anticipated change, it does suggest that religious
ideologies were altered as a new means to a similarly accepted goal.
Micro-Level Distribution Factors
Taking all of these factors into account helps in the understanding of how changes
in values have influenced divorce. Given that most of the transformation took place
around the mid 20th century, this study now aims to detect which patterns continue to
affect the divorce rate today. Although the rate has leveled off in recent years, divorce
has become a fairly standard occurrence. Do the ideologies and values introduced earlier
in this paper continue to affect the divorce rate as they did before, or have their influences
leveled off as the divorce rate has? In other words, are we still experiencing the diluted
effects of the 1960s, or are there new, additional ideas that contribute to the divorce rate
today? Further, how do micro-level factors play a role in divorce? Are certain
demographic groups or religions at a higher risk of divorce than others? For example,
during the time of the Industrial Revolution, families exposed to poverty were forced to
stray away from traditional notions of the family and became susceptible to divorce as a
result (O’Neil 1967). Seeing as low-income families may have been more likely to get
divorced years ago, is that still the case today? Through studying the relationship between
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age at first marriage, race, participation in the workforce, educational attainment, social
class, religion, region and divorce, this study aims to gain insight into whether certain
groups have a higher risk of divorce than others.
Age at first marriage:
Kposowa (1998) found a similar pattern to those suggested in other studies, that
women who marry at a young age have a higher probability of getting divorced.
Although there are a number of factors that may contribute to this fact, it aligns with the
idea that marriages, now made longer by the increased life expectancy, have less of a
chance of ending from the death of one spouse. Thus, the earlier a woman gets married,
the longer her marriage will be, and the more time there is for her marriage to become
unhappy and result in divorce (Kposowa 1998).
Weed (1974) conducted a study over the course of ten years to measure the
relationship between the risk of divorce and younger couples. First done in 1960 and then
replicated in 1970, Weed (1974) found that younger marriages couldn’t be credited for
the divorce rate. However, this study was conducted with a consideration for a number of
other variables that are irrelevant to this study, making its results complex and difficult to
apply here.
Race:
Further, an individual’s race can be used as a factor to determine the risk of
divorce. Studying this particular variable will hopefully provide insight into how divorce,
marriage, and the family are affected by discrimination, inequality, interracial marriage
and other social factors. Kposowa (1998) also looked at the likelihood of same-race
couples to get divorced and found that African American women have a much higher risk
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than their white counterparts. The results of Kposowa’s (1998) study discovered that, by
the end of 5 years of marriage, 20% of African Americans are expected to get a divorce,
whereas this number is only 6% for whites (537). After 25 years of marriage, 70% of
African Americans are expected to get divorced, while only 33% of whites are expected
to get divorced within that same period (Kposowa 1998:537). Although there are many
explanations offered for these results, a particularly interesting one refers to the bitterness
of African American wives towards their husbands. Since opportunities for African
American men have been limited in the past, they are perceived by their wives as
incapable of fulfilling the “breadwinner” role (Kposowa 1998:543). “In time, the wife
may come to view the marriage more as a liability on her, rather than an asset, and thus
be more predisposed to terminating the union” (Kposowa 1998:543). Given that the white
male has successfully fulfilled this role throughout history, this fact may help to explain
the heightened risk of African Americans to get divorced, relative to their white
counterparts.
The idea that race could play a part in the divorce rate is intriguing, since the
amount of interracial couples has increased over the past few years. In 1970, less than 1%
of all married couples were interracial and by 2000, that number had jumped to 6%
(Bratter and King 2008:161). However, studies examining these relationships have
indicated that, “crossing racial lines still violates enduring norms of who should and
should not marry whom” (Bratter and King 2008:160). A study by Bratter and King
(2008) examining the likelihood of divorce among interracial couples versus same-race
couples in the 1980s concluded that within 10 years of marriage, interracial couples were
far more likely than same-race couples to get divorced (167). The biggest disparity
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occurred among marriages initiated between the years 1985 and 1989, “where 55% of
interracial marriages divorced by their 10th year compared to 35.6% of same-race
marriages” (Bratter and King 2008:167).
Furstenberg (1994), Sweezy and Tiefenthaler (1996) and Brown, Orbuch, and
Bauermeister (2008) all concluded similar results to those of Kposowa (1998), that
African Americans are less likely to marry, more likely to divorce, and less likely to
remarry. According to Furstenberg (1994), 10 years after marriage, 47% of blacks have
separated or divorced, compared to 28% of non-Hispanic whites (32). While these
statistics may be intriguing, it is unclear whether Furstenberg (1994) controlled for other
variables, such as income, or simply obtained his facts from census data. Similarly,
Brown et al. (2008) found that black Americans had about two times the odds of divorce
than their white American counterparts (192). Sweezy and Tiefenthaler (1996) found that
Native American women are more than twice as likely to divorce than white women,
whereas Asian women are twice as likely not to experience divorce as white women (61).
The explanation offered in this study was similar to the one given by Kposowa (1998),
that the limited resources offered to minority groups of men in the United States make
women perceive a decrease in their overall marital gain (Sweezy and Tiefenthaler
1996:61).
Although Zhang and Hook (2009) found no statistically significant relationship
between interracial marriage and the risk of divorce, measuring race and ethnicity along
with other factors, such as location, indicated a slight relationship, with mixed marriages
that include blacks as the least stable, followed by Hispanics (Zhang and Hook 2009).
Marriages including Asians were the most stable, a finding that aligns with those of past
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studies, such as Sweezy and Tiefenthaler (1996) (Zhang and Hook 2009). Finally,
marriages with a black husband and a white wife were found to be the least stable (Zhang
and Hook 2009:104). These results suggest the persistence of racism directed towards
black men, supported by the finding that white women married to black men reported
more experiences with first-hand racism (Zhang and Hook 2009:104).
Participation in the Work Force:
As discussed earlier, women’s entrance into the work and labor forces has been
credited as one of the driving factors in the divorce revolution (O’Neil 1967; Halem
1980; Rogers 2004; Yenor 2011). While this may be the case, Raley, Mattingly, and
Bianchi (2006) argue that this shift towards the female breadwinner role is disrupted by
other life factors. For example, they found that, with the birth of a child, women are more
likely than men to leave work and stay home, whereas husbands are more likely to
increase their hours of work when they become fathers (Raley et al. 2006:14). This
theory suggests that the birth of a child works to enhance traditional notions of marriage,
further pushing women into the homemaker role and the men into the breadwinner role.
As such, they reason that women’s participation in the workforce does not have as strong
an effect on marriage stability as previously believed (Raley et al. 2006).
Yenor (2011) attributes the mere ability of women to earn a living to the changing
state of marriage. The division of power with a household hinges upon the dependence of
women on their husbands, creating a strong patriarchal relationship within the family.
The power involved in earning money thus contributes to this division. Therefore,
separate from a woman’s occupation or the amount of money she makes, having the
option to make money is what gives women power and encourages an equal relationship
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(Yenor 2011). Although it has been argued that the entrance of women into the workforce
has damaged traditional notions of marriage, since it allows women the option of
supporting themselves, Yenor (2011) argues that this independence is crucial in
establishing the “dignity of a woman” (Yenor 2011:184). Interestingly, this was one of
the few viewpoints that explained women’s entrance into the workforce through the
framework of promoting feminism, instead of corrupting marriage.
Education:
Women’s participation in the work force was accompanied by a growing number
of women becoming educated. Kposowa (1998) found that “women with some education
(in addition to high school) were nearly 1.3 times as likely to divorce as women with only
high school education” (541). Women that have completed college and obtained graduate
degrees were 1.7 times more likely to divorce than women with only a high school
education (Kposowa 1998:541). Clearly, this study suggests that, the higher a women’s
educational attainment, the more likely she is to get divorced. This idea is explained by
the potential for educated women to have more choices, be more career oriented, and be
“less willing to stay in unions that act as constraints on their career advancement and
personal freedom” (Kposowa 1998:543). However, analyses from this study fail to
legitimately take into account the effects of husbands’ education on marriage.
In contrast to these findings, Schwartz and Han (2014) found that, while
marriages where wives had more education than their husbands had an increased
likelihood of divorced in the 1970s, this is no longer true (621). Their study states that,
that in recent years, wives’ educational advantage has no effect on the likelihood of a
divorce (Schwartz and Han 2014). This suggests a change in attitudes associated with
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gender expectations in marriage and also a decline in the prominence of traditional roles
(Schwartz and Han 2014). Similar to these results, yet offering a difference explanation,
Brown et al. (2008) found that, contrary to popular belief, levels of education do not
necessary lead to divorce. Instead, the more education each spouse has, the less likely
they are to get a divorce (195). The contradicting results found by Kposowa (1998) and
Schwartz and Han (2014) suggest the need to further study the effects of both spouse’s
education on the likelihood of divorce.
Sweezy and Tiefenthaler (1996) also found that more education decreases the
likelihood of divorce. They suggest that their findings support Becker’s idea (1981) that
higher levels of educational attainment “increase marital utility from the division of labor
associated with marriage” (Sweezy and Tiefenthaler 1996:60). Further, this relationship
could be the result of “positive assortative mating”; here, a man’s higher education allows
him to offer more money and human capital, therefore increasing the woman’s perception
that she benefits from the marriage (Sweezy and Tiefenthaler on Becker (1981) 1996:60).
Martin and Parashar (2006) explain these results by an increase in educated
women’s “restrictive attitudes” towards divorce (37). Since the 1970s, educated women
are more likely to both disapprove of divorce and also to get a divorce (Martin and
Parashar 2006). In other words, “highly educated women’s decreasing uncertainty about
stable marriages lowers the personal salience of divorce for them” (Martin and Parashar
2006:38).
Income:
In considering the effects of income, regardless of the sex or composition of the
primary breadwinner arrangement, Kposowa (1998) found that families with higher
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incomes were consistently less likely to get divorced. This may be explained by the idea
that the marital conflict accompanying poverty and financial burden is greatly reduced,
therefore resulting in a decrease in marital breakdown (Kposowa 1998). The overall
capital held by a family thus contributes to their feelings of security and lessens the
effects of this factor on marital conflict.
Rogers and DeBoer (2001) found that changes in women’s resources consistently
reduced the risk of divorce. These changes include both increases and decreases in
income (up to a certain point), and they come at little cost to husbands’ happiness
(Rogers and DeBoer 2001:469-470). While some believe that wives’ income creates a
feeling of financial stability and therefore less commitment to the family, Rogers and
DeBoer (2001) suggest that increases in wives’ financial resources strengthen marital
happiness and stabilize the family (470). However, the study also found that reported
happiness within marriages decreases when women contribute at least or more than half
of the total income (Rogers and DeBoer 2001)..
In another study conducted by Rogers (2004) three years later, he found a
significant relationship between wives’ income and the risk of divorce. According to this
study, with each additional $1,000 in wives’ actual income, up to a certain point, the odds
of divorce increase by approximately 2.5% to 3% (Rogers 2004:67). This supports the
economic independence theory, stating that marital stability is enhanced by wives’
economic dependence on their husbands (Rogers 2004). Rogers’ (2004) study also found
a curvilinear association between the percentage of wives’ income and the probability of
divorce. When wives’ percentage of income was below 50%, any increase elevated the
risk of divorce (Rogers 2004:68). When wives contributed 50% or more, the relationship
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leveled off and finally, when wives contributed more than 60% of the total family
income, the risk of divorce declined (Rogers 2004: 68). These findings are in direct
contradiction to those in Rogers’ earlier study (2001) and although he found a curvilinear
association in the later one, his results still indicate a relationship between women who
earn a significant amount of the total income and the risk of divorce. Sweezy and
Tiefenthaler (1996) also found that women’s income levels have a statistically significant
and positive effect on their risk of divorce. These and Rogers’ (2004) findings can be
explained through the theory that women who work outside of the home “derive and
provide less utility in marriage” (Sweezy and Tiefenthaler 1996:61). As their “shadow
price” decreases, the probability that they will get divorced increases (Sweezy and
Tiefenthaler 1996:61).
Brown et al. (2008) take it one step further by incorporating race and gender into
the effects that income have on divorce. Their study found that greater income reported
by black husbands decreased the likelihood of divorce, whereas greater income reported
by white husbands increased the likelihood of divorce (Brown et al. 2008:195). Kposowa
(1998) offers an explanation for these results earlier, in that economic inequalities work
to highlight the disadvantages experienced by many black American males, while these
advantages may be expected for white American males. These conclusions can be applied
to the situation that is described here, simply by further highlighting the expectations of
white versus black men. When black males experience financial success, it appears as
though they have defeated these obstacles and leads to an increase of marital cohesion,
while the white male’s inability to provide financial resources is seen as a failure.
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Religion/Religiosity:
Religion is also an important lens through which to view marital stability, since it
provides guidelines and a framework through which spouses may shape their marriages
(Brown et al. 2008). Cherlin (2009) maintains that whether or not individuals identify
with any religion at all has an effect on divorce. After the first 15 years of marriage, it
was found that an estimated 41% of religious women got divorced, compared to 56% of
those with no religious affiliation at all (Cherlin 2009:112). This may be the result of
religious institutions that support marriage stability, yet the vagueness of these results
suggest the possibility that other factors were not seriously taken into account, such as the
strength of one’s religious affiliation and the years during which the study was
conducted.
Mahoney (2010), Vaaler, Ellison, and Powers (2009) and a number of other
studies found similar results. Mahoney (2010) discovered that, the higher the religious
attendance, particularly by wives or by couples attending the same denomination
together, the lower the risk of divorce. This relationship exists only if either the wife is a
dedicated member of the spiritual community or the couple is equally as dedicated, and
these results were found throughout a number of studies (Furstenberg 1994; Brown et al.
2008; Vaaler et al. 2009; Mahoney 2010). Brown et al. (2008) provides an explanation
for this finding, that the risk of divorce decreases when just the wife attends more
religious services, and suggests that wives’ attendance in community gatherings
“provides an important resource for maintaining the stability of marriage over time”
(194). Through attending religious services, wives are given the tools they need to deal
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with unhappy marriages, whereas husbands turn to other organizational practices to deal
with these issues (Brown et al. 2008).
Mahoney (2010) and Vaaler et al. (2009) further found that a higher risk of
divorce exists for couples of mixed faiths and for couples where husbands attend
religious services more than their wives (814; 931). There are a number of reasons given
for this discovery, most notably the one proposing that highly religious men may adhere
to a patriarchal gender ideology, which may not appeal to less religious women (Vaaler et
al. 2009:931). This idea suggests an area for potential further study, comparing spouses’
religious affiliations and the degree to which their attitudes regarding gender differ.
Finally, Mahoney (2010) found the risk of divorce to be heightened with mixed faith
couples and when “a less religiously committed spouse resists the spiritual expectations
of a spouse or spiritual community” (Mahoney 2010:814).
Vaaler et al. (2009) found that the risk of divorce is lowest when both husband
and wife attend services, since “families that pray together, stay together” (Vaaler et al.
2009:930). This may be due to a shared ideology, or possibly to the fact that religious
couples may face higher social costs of marital dissolution (Vaaler et al. 2009). Further,
they found that one particular type of mixed-faith marriage appears to have the highest
risk of divorce: couples in which the wives are members of an “exclusivist (i.e.
fundamentalist, evangelical, or sectarian) faith are especially prone to divorce” (Vaaler et
al. 2009:930). The study addressed this finding by explaining that women identifying
with these types of religions often try to “domesticate” men, giving them more family
responsibility and leadership (Vaaler et al. 2009:931). Women that are disappointed with

	
  

	
   31	
  

any failure in these responsibilities may also be more inclined to get a divorce (Vaaler et
al. 2009:931).
Glass and Levchak (2014) found that conservative Protestant communities have
higher levels of divorce than others. Although there may potentially be a number of
factors contributing to these results, one possible explanation is that, “as conservative
Protestant presence increases, elite conservative Protestant influence grows stronger,
which results in policies and programs that do little to reduce divorce, but only increase
early marriage” (Glass and Levchak 2014:1035). This idea suggests that, in these types of
religious practices, early marriage is idealized, but the resources needed for improving
marriage quality are either weak or considered unnecessary.
Region:
Studying the variations in trends between regions can reveal insight into how the
features of a given geographical location can affect social behavior. Explanations
regarding the divorce rate among different states often require an understanding of the
relationships between factors such as race, class, religion, and history. As previously
stated, Glass and Levchak (2014) concluded that communities with high amounts of
conservative Protestants actually have a higher divorce rate than others. While this
finding cannot explain patterns of divorce in the South, it can signify the effects of
community norms and Protestant teachings on location. As previously discussed, as
concentrations of Protestant people became more pronounced, their values and teachings
did as well (Glass and Levchak 2014). This statistic may therefore be a function of the
compositions of communities and the perpetuation of certain beliefs.
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Effective dates of the no-fault divorce law reform may also have a regional effect
on the divorce rate. Nakonezny et al. (1995) found a noticeable decrease in the divorce
rate in Nevada after the adoption of no-fault divorce across the 50 states. Before no-fault
divorce became an option, this study claims that Nevada “was a divorce mill where an
expedient divorce was available to married couples in the United States” (Nakonezny et
al. 1995:486). Once other states began accepting this reform, traveling to Nevada to
obtain a divorce was no longer a requirement.
In another study, it was found that divorce rates generally increase in the United
States going from East to West and from North to South (Fenelon 1971:326). This
occurrence has been referred to as the effects of a “frontier atmosphere”, proposing that
certain environments are more conducive to “individuality and freedom from traditional
social restraints” (Fenelon 1971:326). Explanations for these findings are similar to those
offered by Halem (1980), who suggested that certain societies and norms are more
tolerant of divorce. However, given that this study took place in the early 1970s, its
results may be outdated.
Sweezy and Tiefenthaler (1996) found that couples living in metropolitan areas
are significantly more likely to get divorced. These results may be due to the options
available to urban women versus rural women. In urban environments, women are faced
with more financial options, less of a stigma around divorce, and less search costs for
finding a new partner (Sweezy and Tiefenthaler 1996:61). Further, this study found that
states with a higher percentage of Christian Fundamentalists have a significantly lower
divorce rate (Sweezy and Tiefenthaler 1996). Their finding, that states with a higher
number of Baptists, Lutherans, Methodists, and Mormons have lower divorce rates,
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indicates that divorce is influenced by community norms, which was similarly concluded
by Glass and Levchak (2014) (Sweezy and Tiefenthaler 1996:62). This is especially
important to my study, since it examines the interaction between micro-level factors such
as region and religion and how they work together to affect the divorce rate.

Conclusions:

Starting in the mid 20th century, the divorce rate increased at a shockingly fast

rate, yet has leveled off in recent years. By the year 1980, one in every two marriages
would end in divorce and, by the end of the century, American marriages produced a rate
of over one million divorces a year, a number that can be reduced to one divorce every 13
seconds (Riley 1991:156). During the late 19th century and early 20th century, divorce
was much less socially accepted, had financial repercussions, required the confirmation
of fault, and was limited by the legal system (Cherlin 2009; Nakonezny et al. 1995;
O’Neil 1967; Riley 1991; Vlosky et al. 2002; Weitzman 1985; Wheeler 1974; Wright and
Stetson 1978 and Yenor 2011). A study of the macro-level causes for the divorce rate
indicates a strong relationship between the ideological revolution during the 1960s, while
the leveling out of divorce may be attributed to a period of relative social rest (Cherlin
2009; Furstenberg 1994; Halem 1980; Herman 1992; Kent 1992; Morgan 1991;
Nakonezny et al. 1995; O’Neil 1967; Riley 1991; Shoen and Canudas-Romo 2006;
Schwartz and Han 2014; Vlosky and Monroe 2002; Weitzman 1985; Wheeler 1974;
Wright and Stetson 1978 and Yenor 2011). Ideological reform such as the shifted focus
of society towards “the self” produced a change in life goals, potentially altering people’s
motivations to get and stay married. Events such as the entrance of women into the
workforce and the option of contraceptives have both provided support for some of the
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ideas introduced by feminism. This increasing independence of women from their
husbands may play a role in the willingness of women to get a divorce. Legal reform
allowed people to get divorced without the customary necessity of finding fault, making
the process of divorce much easier. Finally, a transformation in the values taught in
certain religions, such as the emphasis on “the self”, occurred at around the same time
that the divorce rate rapidly increased. Yet, the precise direction of this relationship is
unknown.
In an attempt to identify the extent to which these ideologies affect the risk of
divorce on the micro-level, I will conduct an analysis of literature and studies that have
been published on these topics. The effects of social groups such as age at first marriage,
race, education, income, religion, and region have revealed some intriguing patterns.
However, I have found contradictory results within almost every category. Therefore, this
study will aim to draw more definitive, causal connections between micro-level correlates
and causes of divorce. Can features such as race and income predict divorce and to what
extent do their explanations interact with one another? Are these relationships due to the
ideologies that emerged during the 1960s, or are they attributable to trends within modern
day society? It is my hope that this study will further define causal connections and
contribute to the existing literature on the predictors of divorce.
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Chapter 2: Methods
Having just explored the influences of macro-level factors on the divorce rate over
the past few decades, it is now be the aim of this paper to draw more definitive
conclusions regarding the effects of micro-level factors on the risk of divorce and how
these factors have changed over time. My primary source for obtaining data was the
General Social Survey. The GSS is a trend survey conducted by the National Opinion
Research Center that measures and monitors societal change in the United States. The
survey includes a “core” of demographic, behavioral and attitudinal questions, in addition
to topics of special interest. Many of these measures have remained unchanged since the
GSS first began in 1972, allowing time-trend studies as well as replications of other
studies. The GSS is well known as “the single best source of data on societal trends” and
contains 5,545 variables, time trends for 2,072 variables and 268 trends that have 20+
data points. This serves as a valuable tool for measuring variables such as demographics,
opinions, and behaviors, since it covers a vast range of topics and includes consistent data
for over 40 years (NORC. “The General Social Survey.”
http://www3.norc.org/Gss+website/).
Measuring Dependent Variables
To measure the rate of divorce, I used the variables “DIVORCE” and
“MARITAL.” While neither of these variables solely measures the rate of marriages that
end in divorce, they do measure whether respondents have ever been married and the
number of respondents currently divorced or separated. “DIVORCE” is a nominal
variable and asks respondents, “If currently married or widowed: Have you ever been
divorced or legally separated?” “MARITAL” is also a nominal variable and asks
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respondents, “Are you currently- married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you
never been married?” In order to apply more directly to my study, the variables
“DIVORCE” and “MARITAL” have been combined to create “Divorced.” This variable
excludes respondents who are separated and includes respondents who have been
divorced but are now remarried.
Measuring Independent Variables
Decades:
In order to measure changes in trends over time, I recoded the variable “decade”
into four categories: 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. The 2000s includes surveys from
2000 to 2012. Throughout each analysis, “seventies” is used as a comparison category.
Demographic Variables
Independent variables were divided into four groups: Religion, Demographics,
Social Class, and Values and were chosen based on the consistency with which they were
used since the start of the survey. To measure whether age at first marriage affects
respondents’ risk of divorce, the variable “AGEWED” was recoded into two dummy
variables, “Less than 21” (including respondents who got married when they were 21 or
younger) and “Over 21” (including respondents who got married at age 22 or above).
Less than 21 was used as the reference category throughout the study. To determine
whether race has any effect on the risk of divorce, the variable “RACE” was recoded into
three dummy variables, including “White”, “Black” and “Other.” White was used as the
reference category, allowing me to measure the risk of divorce for participants in the
“Black” and “Other” categories relative to white respondents. To measure educational
attainment, the variable DEGREE was recoded into three groups, each representing
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higher levels of education. “Less than High School”, “High School” and “Some College”
permitted me to determine whether educational attainment has any effect on respondents’
risk of divorce, relative to those who have a high school degree, which was used as the
reference category in this group. The variable REGION was recoded into nine dummy
variables, each representing a different category. These dummy variables were then
grouped into “North” and “South.” The Northern regions included New England, Middle
Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, Mountain and Pacific. The Southern
regions included West South Central, East South Central, and South Atlantic. The
Southern regions were used as the reference category, which allowed me to measure the
risk of divorce for respondents in the Northern regions relative to those in the South.
Religious Affiliation
Religious affiliation was measured by recoding the variables RELIG and
DENOM into “Reltrad” (Steensland et al 2000). This variable included the categories:
Evangelical Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Black Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Other
Religion and None. Each category was recoded into its own dummy variable and
respondents with no religion were used as the reference category. Further, the variable
ATTEND measured respondents’ religious activity by asking, “How often do you attend
religious services?” and it was used to determine whether the amount of religious
participation respondents took part in had an effect on the risk of divorce. Unlike many of
the other variables, ATTEND is an ordinal level of measurement, so results were based
on each additional level of reported religious attendance, with higher scores representing
more frequent attendance. Frequencies tables for each of these variables are available in
Table 2.1.
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Social Class Variables
To determine whether respondents’ income affected their risk of divorce, I used
the variable CONINC. Since the dollar has experienced so much inflation over the course
of the past few decades, I chose CONINC because it is asked fairly consistently and
because it controls inflation by measuring income in constant 2000 dollars. Given the fact
that respondents have the option of choosing between almost thousands of categories for
this variable, I recoded it into three separate groups, beginning with the minimum option,
60384 in constant 2000 dollars and below (Low Income). The next group took that
number and doubled it, making a Middle Income group (60384 to 120385). The final
group consisted of respondents with High Incomes of 120386 and up. The group with the
lowest income was used as the reference category in the regression model. CLASS, a
variable that asks respondents their subjective class position, was recoded to include
respondents who perceived themselves to be in the lower or working classes in one
dummy variable and those who perceived themselves to be in the middle and upper
classes as another dummy variable. Although the distribution was fairly split, I decided to
use the lower/working class variable as the reference category.
Values
Finally, one of the key points explored in the literature review was how traditional
gender roles have changed over time. Thus, two variables that measure respondents’
views towards gender roles were used to determine whether these attitudes have an effect
on divorce. FEFAM is an ordinal-level of measurement that asks respondents to state
how strongly they agree with the following statement, “It is much better for everyone
involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the
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home and family”, with 1 being “strongly agree” and 4 being “strongly disagree.” This
same scale is used to measure respondents’ views towards women’s entrance into the
workforce with the variable FECHLD, which states, “A working mother can establish
just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.”
The literature review also discussed the acceptance of birth control and contraception in
great detail. The variable PREMARSX asks respondents, “If a man and woman have sex
relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong
only sometimes, or not wrong at all?” Since each of these variables is an ordinal-level of
measurement, the risk of divorce was determined based on each additional level that
respondents reported.
Analytic Strategy
Trend Analysis
In order to get a sense of the trends and patterns that characterize America’s
attitudes and actions towards divorce, the next chapter begins with the results of tests
conducted on variables that measure changes in the marriage and divorce rates. Using
cross tabulations, these variables include “MARITAL”, “DIVORCE”, and “Divorced.”
Next, I used three variables that reflect changes in respondents’ attitudes regarding when
they believe divorce is acceptable, how easy they believe it is to get a divorce, and
whether obtaining a divorce should be more or less difficult. These variables include
“DIVBEST”, “DIVNOW”, and “DIVLAW.” Finally, I used the independent variables
included in the religion, demographics, social class, and values groups for the remainder
of the study. Table 2.1 displays the general distribution of each of these variables.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Correlates of Divorce
Variables
Demographics
Age at first marriage

Mean

St. Deviation

AGEWED
Less than 21
Over 21
Race
RACE
White
Black
Other
Education
DEGREE

22.15
0.54
0.46

4.89
0.5
0.5

Less than High School
High School
Some College
Region
REGION

Mode

Text

If ever married: How old were you when you

21 first married?
1 Less than 21 Agewed dummy (yes=1, no=0)
0 Over 21 Agewed dummy (yes=1, no=0)
What race do you consider yourself?

0.81
0.14
0.05

0.39
0.35
0.22

1 White race dummy (yes=1, other=0)
0 Black race dummy (yes=1, other=0)
0 Other race dummy (yes=1, other=0)

1.32

1.16

1 Respondent's highest degree

0.66
0.07
0.27

0.47
0.25
0.44

1 no=0)
0 Degree high school dummy (yes=1, no=0)
0 Degree some college dummy (yes=1, no=0)

Degree less than high school dummy (yes=1,

Region of interview
Region New England dummy (yes=1,
other=0)
Region Middle Atlantic dummy (yes=1,
other-0)
Region E. N. Central dummy (yes=1, other0)
Region W. N. Central dummy (yes=1,
other=0)

New England

0.05

0.21

0

Middle Atlantic

0.15

0.36

0

E. N. Central

0.19

0.39

0

W. N. Central
S. Atlantic

0.07
0.19

0.26
0.39

0
0 Region S. Atlantic dummy (yes=1, other-0)

E. S. Central

0.07

0.25

0 other=0)

0.09
0.06
0.13
0.65
0.35

0.29
0.24
0.34
0.48
0.48

0
0
0
1
0

44503.04

35936.01

Low Income

0.76

0.43

1 2000 dollars (yes=1, no=0)

Middle Income

0.19

0.39

0 constant 2000 dollars (yes=1, no=0)

0.05
2.46

0.22
0.66

0 2000 dollars (yes=1, no=0)
2 Subjective class identification

W. S. Central
Mountain
Pacific
North
South
Income
CONINC

High Income
Class

	
  

Region E. S. Central dummy (yes=1,
Region W. S. Central dummy (yes=1,
other=0)
Region Mountain dummy (yes=1, other=0)
Region Pacific dummy (yes=1, other=0)
North region dummy (yes=1, no=0)
South region dummy (yes=1, no=0)

39695 Family income in constant dollars
Family income less than 60384 in constant
Family income from 60385 to 120385 in
Family income 120386 and up in constant
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Lower/Working class
Middle/Upper class
Religion
RELIG
DENOM

0.51
0.49

0.5
0.5

Class lower or working dummy (yes=1,

1 no=0)
0 Class middle or upper dummy (yes=1, no=0)
Respondent's religious identity

Evangelical Protestant

0.19

0.4

0

Mainline Protestant

0.24

0.42

0

Black Protestant

0.09

0.3

0

Catholic

0.29

0.45

0

Jewish

0.02

0.15

0

Other Religion

0.03

0.17

0

None

0.13

0.33

0

ATTEND

3.83

2.71

7

Specific denomination
RELIG and DENOM Evangelical dummy
(yes=1, other=0)
RELIG and DENOM Mainline dummy
(yes=1, other=0)
RELIG and DENOM Black Protestant
dummy (yes=1, other=0)
RELIG and DENOM Catholic dummy
(yes=1, other=0)
RELIG and DENOM Jewish dummy (yes=1,
other=0)
RELIG and DENOM Other Faith dummy
(yes=1, other=0)
RELIG and DENOM non affiliated dummy
(yes=1, other=0)
How often respondent attends religious
services

Values
Gender roles
Better for man to work, women to stay home

FEFAM
2.67
0.86
3 and take care of home and family
FECHLD
2.56
0.81
3 Mother working doesn't hurt child
Premarital Sex
PREMARSX
2.77
1.25
4 Sex before marriage
Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. AGEWED, RACE, DEGREE, REGION,
CONINC, CLASS, RELIG, DENOM, ATTEND, FEFAM, FECHLD, PREMARSX.

Regressions
Next, regression models were used to measure the variable “divorced” with each
group of independent variables. Given the fact that events such as the passing of no-fault
divorce laws took place mostly in the 1970s, the variable “seventies” was used as the
reference category. Each model features the slope (B), the standard deviation, and the
odds ratio. Without the addition of any control variables, Model A (Table 3.1) displays
the rate of divorce throughout each decade, relative to the 1970s, and was used as the
baseline model throughout most of the study.
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Once the initial model was conducted, each dummy variable for religious
identification was added as a covariate in the regression model. Since the category “No
Religion” was left out, the regression analysis helped me determine what the risk of
divorce was for each religious category, compared to respondents with no religion. For
the first religion regression model, I left out the variable ATTEND in order to determine
whether religious participation plays a role in the risk of divorce and whether this role
varies between religious groups. The next model (Model C) incudes ATTEND and an
analysis of the results between Models B and C determined whether participation matters
for different religions in the overall risk of divorce. The purpose of introducing these
control variables was to determine whether the slopes, odds ratios and significance
numbers for the decades change. If they have, then I may conclude that respondents’
religious identification had an influence on the risk of divorce.
The same process was applied to the group “demographic variables” to determine
whether certain demographic attributes have an effect on the risk of divorce. Unlike the
religious affiliation group, this group includes a number of comparison categories. Age at
first marriage was measured by comparing the risk of divorce for respondents that got
married at age 22 and older, relative to those who got married at age 21 and under. The
risk of divorce for categories “Black” and “Other” were measured against the category
“White”, while differing levels of educational attainment were measured against the
recoded middle group, respondents who have a high school degree. The effect of location
on the risk of divorce was measured by using the southern regions as a comparison
category. Social class variables represent the third group, and consist of income and
perception of social class. The regression model with divorced, decades, and values did
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not have any reference categories, since each variable is an ordinal-level of measurement.
Thus, I was able to determine whether the risk of divorce increases or decreases with the
strength of respondents’ reported opinions regarding gender roles and premarital sex.
Once the effects of each independent variable had been assessed, all four groups
were combined in a full regression model. The purpose of adding every control variable
was to identify how much each one contributed to the overall trend of divorce, once other
factors had been accounted for. By comparing the slopes and odds ratios of these results
to those of previous models, I was able to determine how each independent variable
affected the risk of divorce, without worrying about spurious results. Results were
significant if they differed from those in previous models, since this would have indicated
a partial explanation of this variable from another control. Comparing the slopes, odds
ratios and sigs for the decades in Models A and G (Table 3.6) helped to understand how
these variables all work together to explain the trend of divorce. If the application of
these controlled variables worked, then the slope of each decade will have approached
zero and the Exp(B) will have approached one.
For this section, I used the equation:
100  ×

𝐵1 − 𝐵2
𝐵1

This equation helped to determine how well the control variables explained the rate of
divorce by measuring the change of the decade coefficient slopes both before and after
the controls have been applied.
Interaction Tests
The final analysis combined the variables in “decade” with each religion dummy
and each value variable. The purpose of this was to determine whether the effects that
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religion and values have on the risk of divorce have changed over time. Each dummy
variable included in this interaction test was coded separately with each decade variable.
Therefore, recoded variables included “eighties” and “Evangelical”, “nineties” and
“Evangelical”, “twothousands” and “Evangelical”, etc. When conducting this interaction
analysis, each main effect as well as the interaction effects were included. Variables prior
to recoding served as the main effects, which were then compared to the recoded
variables. Unlike with previous analyses, interaction results were analyzed based on
associations only within that model. If a comparison between the main effect and the
three recoded variables for that category displayed results that were statistically
significant yet unchanged, then it can be said that this variable has continued to affect
divorce in the same way through each decade. If interaction term results were statistically
significant and yielded differing results across each variable, then I could conclude that
the effects of this variable on the risk of divorce have changed over time. Finally, if
results were statistically non-significant, then the effects of that variable on the risk of
divorce have continued to be ineffective. This final analysis explored the main effects of
religious affiliation and value on the risk of divorce, as well as how their effects have
changed over time.
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Chapter 3: Results
The events and ideologies discussed earlier present a period of pivotal change for
American society. As values began to change, the divorce rate increased rapidly. This
chapter begins with an examination of the changes in marriage and divorce patterns,
using six measures from the General Social Survey that have been asked between the
years 1972-2012. Although these variables were not asked frequently enough to be
included in the final analysis, they provide helpful insight into the American population’s
attitudes regarding divorce, right at the most crucial periods of time. Results support the
idea that ideological and societal changes have had effects on the institutions of marriage
and divorce, both in terms of the divorce rates and on attitudes regarding divorce.
The second part of this chapter attempts to assess the effects of independent
variables on the risk of divorce. These variables have been organized into two groups:
attributes, which includes categories for religion, demographics, and social class, and
values, which includes variables that measure respondents’ attitudes regarding gender
roles and premarital sex. First, I conducted regression models for each group of
independent variables against both the divorce rate and also the decades. By analyzing
the slope, sig, and odds ratio of each variable against the reference category, I was able to
determine whether certain variables increase, decrease, or do not affect respondents’ risk
of divorce, relative to that category. In the final model, each group of variables was
combined in order to avoid spurious results. Finally, I computed a series of interaction
variables by combining the categories for decades and religion and for decades and
values, a total of 30 new variables. The purpose of this analysis was to determine the
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ways that the effects of religion and values on the risk of divorce have changed over time,
or if their effects have remained the same.
Dependent Variables
Divorce Variables
Figure 3.1 What is your marital status? (1972-2012)
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Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. MARITAL, “4. Are you currently- married,
widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been married?”

To begin, Figure 3.1 displays the overall pattern of American marriages from 1972 to
2012. The typical American’s marital status has shifted substantially over the course of
these forty years. Only two categories remain steady throughout the graph, “Widowed”
and “Separated.” However, “Married”, “Divorced”, and “Never Married” all display
substantial changes from the years 1972-2012. The most significant trend change is
within the “Married” category. In 1972, 71.9% of respondents reported being married, yet
that percentage drops to 53.9%, only slightly more than half of respondents, in 2012. This
category also experiences the most sudden change, decreasing a total of 18.4% between
the years 1974 and 1982. With only a few instances of variation, the “married” category
continues to decrease after 2004, raising only 2% between the years 2010 and 2012. The
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percent of respondents who reported never having been married jumped from 13% in
1972 to 20.5% in 2012, with slight dips in 1983, 1993, and 2008; otherwise, this upward
trend is fairly consistent. Respondents who reported being divorced also show an upward
trend, having gone from only 4% in 1972 to 12.4% in 2012, with one significant dip in
2008. These figures, however, may mask the prevalence of marital dissolution because
they only show current marital status.
Figure 3.2: Have you ever been divorced or separated? (1972-2012)
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Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. DIVORCE, “4b. If currently married or
widowed: Have you ever been divorced or legally separated?”

To assess the rate of divorce and remarriage, I examine the question of whether
respondents have been divorced or separated in the past. As predicted, the rate of divorce
has experienced a noticeable change. Both responses indicate similar trends, suggesting a
slight increase in divorce or legal separation between the years 1972 to 2012.
Respondents who reported having never been divorced or separated went from 85.5% in
1972 to 75.2% in 2012, indicating a decrease of slightly lower than 10%. Similar findings
are found with respondents who reported having been divorced or separated, going from
14.5% in 1972 to 24.8% in 2012, an increase of slightly over 10%. These results
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demonstrate a trend that, in terms of respondents who have been married, the number that
get divorced or legally separated has increased while the number that do not has
decreased. Although these results do support the original notion that the rate of divorce
has gone up, they do not indicate quite as dramatic an increase as expected.
Figure 3.3: Ever been divorced (may be remarried)? (1972-2012)
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Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. DIVORCED, “Ever been divorced (may be
remarried)?” Recoded from MARITAL and DIVORCE.

Although the previous variables measured divorce and marriage in the United States, the
purpose of this study is to measure the rate of divorce for those respondents who have
been legally divorced, not separated. The variable “Divorced” was recoded from the GSS
variables “MARITAL” and “DIVORCE” for the purpose of identifying only the
respondents whose marriages have ended due to divorce, including those who have
gotten remarried. This graph indicates a fairly significant change in the rate of divorce
between the years 1972 and 2012. Respondents who report having been divorced at one
point goes from 15.7% in 1972 to 29.4% in 2012, an increase of 87%. At it’s maximum,
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the rate of respondents who reported having had a divorce was 31% in 2006. The rate of
divorce experiences minor decreases during the years 1974, 1989, 1992, and 2008, yet
none represents a reversal of the trend. It does appear, however, that the rate has
stabilized at around 30% from 1996 forward.
Attitudes
Figure 3.4: Divorce as best solution to marital problems (1994-2012)
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Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. DIVBEST, “1299. Do you agree or
disagree…Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can’t seem to work out their
marriage problems.”

Much of the societal change that occurred in America had to do with ideology. Thus, it is
important to measure not only the divorce rate, but also the degree to which people’s
opinions towards divorce have changed over the years. As indicated in the graph above,
each response shows at least a slight change over the course of the 28 years and 3 times
the question was asked. The first option, “Strongly Agree”, went from 9.1% in 1994 to
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13.6% in 2002 and then suddenly decreases to 7.2% in 2012. Respondents in the “Agree”
category went from 39.4% in 1994, then decreased to 29.4% in 2002 and then 44.8% in
2012, suggesting that respondents’ opinions rapidly changed. Also notable were the
respondents that chose “Neither Agree Nor Disagree”, which went from 19.5% in 1994,
to 20.3% in 2002 and 14.8% in 2012, suggesting that more respondents developed
opinions on the matter. Significantly, opinions seem to level out between the years 1994
and 2002, with the less popular options showing an increase and the most popular options
showing a decrease. However, in 2012, each option appears farther apart than it was in
1994.
Figure 3.5: How easy is it to get a divorce today? (1988)
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Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. DIVNOW, “In general, would you say that
the law makes is easy or difficult for people who want to get divorced?”

Before the 1970s, obtaining a divorce in any state required the finding of fault, making
the process a difficult one. By the 1980s, nearly every state had adopted more relaxed
divorce laws. The typical American’s opinion on divorce laws, as indicated in Figure 3.5,
demonstrates the belief that divorce has become legally much easier to obtain. Nearly
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half of respondents believe that the law makes divorce very easy at 42.7%, whereas only
3.9% of respondents believe that the law makes getting a divorce very difficult.
Responses in between “Very Easy” and “Very Difficult” decrease at a steady rate, with
the largest difference occurring between the options “Fairly Easy”, at 33.1%, and
“Neither”, at 14.7%.
Figure 3.6: Should divorce in this country be easier or more difficult to obtain than
it is now?	
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Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. DIVLAW, “Should divorce in this country be
easier or more difficult to obtain than it is now?”

Changing the norms and laws that govern a society first requires a change in the attitudes
of the people affected by these laws. Since the early 1970s, when the first no-fault
divorce laws had been implemented in a few states, opinions regarding how easy it
should be to obtain a divorce have remained relatively unchanged. The most dramatic
change occurs in the “More Difficult” category, when results went from 50.7% in 1977
down to 43.5% in 1978 and then back up to 50.3% in 1982. Further, the “More Difficult”
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and “Easier” categories begin to merge, with a difference of 20.1% in 2006, and then a
difference of only 5.8% in the year 2012.
Independent Variables: The Macro and Micro-Level Correlates of Divorce
The graphs above display trends of changing attitudes and actions regarding
divorce. In order to identify the ways in which micro-level factors interact to produce
changes in divorce, I have used a number of independent variables that can be
categorized into two groups: attributes and values. Attributes are further separated into
religion, demographics, and social class. Religion includes each of the dummy variables
recoded from the variable “Reltrad.” Demographics include age at first marriage, race,
education, and region. Social class categories include CONINC and CLASS, a variable
that asks respondents for their subjective social class position. These groups served the
purpose of controls in the final model and to determine whether particular religions,
demographics, social class variables, or values are more prone to divorce than others. A
series of regression models were computed, beginning with a baseline model displaying
the interaction between the divorce rate and decades. Then, each group of variables was
separately added to Model A in order to determine how each one separately affects the
overall risk of divorce. Next, each group of variables was combined into the same model
to see how they interact to effect the divorce rate together, as well as how well this
particular set of variables explain the trend of divorce. Finally, I created interaction terms
that combine the variables “decade” and religion categories, then “decade” and values,
for the purpose of determining how the effects of religion and traditional values have
changed over time.

	
  

	
   53	
  

Decade
After conducting a series of logistic regression models, I am able to identify how
the risk of divorce is influenced by different variables. Table 3.1 displays the risk of
divorce throughout each decade, without controlling for other variables. The odds ratio
(Exp(B)) for the Constant in this model explains how high a risk of divorce people were
at during the 1970s, which is used as the comparison category throughout the model. For
this model, all variables are statistically significant. Staring at 0.207, results indicate that
in the 1970s, individuals faced a 20.7% risk of getting divorced. In subsequent decades,
relative to the 1970s, people were 1.44 times or 44% more likely to get divorced in the
1980s, 1.89 times (89%) more likely to get divorced in the 1990s, and 2 times or 100%
more likely to get divorced in the 2000s. These findings indicate a rather large increase
from the 1970s to the 1980s, and a steadily decreasing, yet positive nonetheless, increase
in subsequent decades.
Table 3.1: Regression Model for Decades
Model A

Constant
Eighties
Nineties
Two Thousands

B
SE
Exp(B)
-1.574***
0.026
0.207
0.365***
0.033
1.44
0.638***
0.032
1.892
0.697***
0.03
2.007

Note: GSS for 1972-2012. Dependent variable: If ever been married: every been legally
divorced? Control variable: decade 1970s. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.

Religion
Table 3.2 explores the risk of getting divorced for various religions, in
comparison to those with no religion. Model B shows that, relative to those identifying
with no religion, Evangelical Protestants are 1.35 times or 35% more likely to get
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divorced, and Mainline Protestants are 1.127 or 12% more likely to get divorced. The
results of Black Protestantism and Other Religion are statistically non-significant,
meaning that they have the same risk of getting divorced as those with no religion. Both
Catholics and Jews produce statistically significant results for these categories. Relative
to those with no religion, Catholics have a 25.8% decreased risk and Jews have a 25.7%
decreased risk of divorce.
Once the effects of religion have been controlled for, we can compare the slopes
and odds ratios for the decades between Models A and B. Although all of the results are
statistically significant, there is very little change between those in Model A and those in
Model B. Thus, controlling for religious groups in this model explains very little of the
trend of divorce throughout the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.
Model C shows the risk of divorce through these religious categories, yet with the
addition of the variable ATTEND, which measures the level of respondents’ religious
participation. Out of the six categories in this model, the first three indicate statistically
significant increases in the risk of divorce. Similarly with the results of Model B,
Evangelical Protestants are 1.89 times or 89% more likely to get divorced than those with
no religion and Mainline Protestants are 1.46 times or 46% more likely to get divorced
than those with no religion. The results of these categories in both Model B and Model C
are statistically significant, yet the risk of divorce associated with these religious groups
become stronger and the group gets bigger, even once participation has been controlled
for. Although Black Protestantism does not produce statistically significant results in
Model B, Model C shows that they are 1.49 times or 49% more likely to get divorced
than those identifying with no religion. With the application of the variable ATTEND,
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and categories “Jewish” and “Catholic” produce statistically non-significant results.
Further, with a slope of -0.098 and an Exp(B) of -0.907, religious attendance (ATTEND)
is negatively associated with the risk of getting divorced. With each additional level of
religious participation that respondents report (or each additional day per week that they
attend services), they are 9.3% less likely to get divorced than those that have no
religious affiliation at all.
In order to determine whether controlling for ATTEND affects the risk of divorce,
I compare the results of the decades in Model A to Model B and then Model A to Model
C. As I mentioned before, the results of the first comparison suggest that controlling for
religion has had very little effect in explaining the overall risk of divorce. Results for the
second comparison, though increased in size, are fairly similar to those of the first. Thus,
although ATTEND does not fully explain the trend of divorce throughout the decades, it
does seem to have an effect on the risk of divorce among different religions.
Table 3.2: Regression Model for Decades and Religious Affiliation
	
  	
  
Constant	
  
Eighties	
  
Nineties	
  
Two	
  Thousands	
  
Religion	
  Variables	
  
Evangelical	
  Protestant	
  
Mainline	
  Protestant	
  
Black	
  Protestant	
  
Catholic	
  
Jewish	
  
Other	
  Religion	
  
ATTEND	
  

B	
  
-‐1.574	
  
0.365***	
  
0.638***	
  
0.697***	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  

Model A
SE	
   Exp(B)	
  
0.026	
   0.207	
  
0.033	
  
1.44	
  
0.032	
   1.892	
  
0.03	
   2.007	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  

Model B
B	
  
SE	
  
-‐1.632***	
   0.041	
  
0.382***	
   0.036	
  
0.671***	
   0.036	
  
0.727***	
   0.034	
  

Exp(B)	
  
0.196	
  
1.465	
  
1.955	
  
2.068	
  

Model C
B	
  
SE	
  
(-‐1.54)***	
   0.041	
  
0.377***	
   0.036	
  
0.658***	
   0.036	
  
0.718***	
   0.034	
  

	
  	
   0.303***	
   0.037	
   1.354	
   0.641***	
  
	
  	
  
0.12**	
   0.037	
   1.127	
   0.382***	
  
	
  	
  
0.045	
   0.045	
   1.046	
   0.402***	
  
	
  	
   -‐0.299***	
   0.037	
   0.742	
  
0.011	
  
	
  	
   -‐0.296***	
   0.081	
   0.743	
  
-‐0.128	
  
	
  	
  
-‐0.077	
   0.068	
   0.925	
  
0.152*	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
   -‐0.098***	
  

0.041	
  
0.039	
  
0.048	
  
0.039	
  
0.082	
  
0.069	
  
0.005	
  

Note: GSS for 1972-2012. Dependent variable: If ever been married: every been legally
divorced? Control variable: decade 1970s, No religion. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.
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Exp(B)	
  
0.214	
  
1.458	
  
1.931	
  
2.05	
  
1.898	
  
1.465	
  
1.494	
  
1.011	
  
0.88	
  
1.164	
  
0.907	
  

Demographics
Table 3.3 shows the risk of divorce associated with demographic variables such as
age at first marriage, race, education and region. The first variable, recoded to represent
respondents who got married at the age of 22 or above, shows strong, statistically
significant, negative results. With a slope of -0.715 and an odds ratio of 0.489, I can say
that respondents who got married at age 22 or above are 51% less likely to get divorced,
relative to the respondents who got married at age 21 or below. The next category, race,
displays statistically significant results for black respondents, but not for respondents of
another race. Thus, relative to white respondents, the comparison category for this
variable, black respondents are 1.28 times or 28% more likely to get divorced. Since the
results in the category “Other Race” are not statistically significant, they have the same
risk as white respondents to get divorced. Levels of educational attainment shows
statistically significant results for respondents who have at least some college, yet
statistically non-significant results for those who have less than high school. Therefore,
relative to those who have a high school degree (the reference group for this variable),
respondents who have at least some college are 21% less likely to get divorced. Finally,
the category “region”, separating respondents into the north and south regions, yielded
statistically non-significant results.
With these demographic variables controlled for, I can compare the slopes and
odds ratios of the decades in Model A and Model D. In Model A, the odds ratio of the
Constant was 0.207. The application of control variables such as age at first marriage,
race, education, and region in Model D changes the likelihood of divorce to 0.337 in the
1970s, a decrease of almost 13 percentage points. In the decades following, respondents
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were 1.74 times or 74% more likely to get divorced in the 1980s, an increase of 30
percentage points from Model A. These findings indicate that changes in population
characteristics in the 1980s resulted in a lower divorce rate than would have been
observed if the population had retained the same demographic profile as was observed in
the 1970s. In the 1990s, respondents were 2.43 times (or 143%) more likely to get
divorced than in the 1970s, an increase of 54%. Finally, respondents were 3.50 times or
250% more likely to get divorced in the 2000s than in the 1970s, an increase of 161%.
These results show how the risk of divorce has changed throughout the decades, once
demographic variables have been introduced.
Table 3.3: Regression Model for Decades and Demographic Variables

Constant
Eighties
Nineties
Two Thousands
Demographic
Variables
Married 21+
Black
Other
Less Than HS Degree
Some College
North

B
-1.574***
0.365***
0.638***
0.697***

Model A
SE
0.026
0.033
0.032
0.03

Exp(B)
0.207
1.44
1.892
2.007

B
-1.087***
0.555***
0.891***
1.254***

Model D
SE
Exp(B)
0.085
0.337
0.043
1.743
0.050
2.437
0.076
3.503

-0.715***
0.249***
-0.23
-0.067
-0.24**
-0.039

0.036
0.055
0.12
0.074
0.081
0.037

0.489
1.283
0.795
0.935
0.787
0.961

Note: GSS for 1972-2012. Dependent variable: If ever been married: every been legally
divorced? Control variable: decade 1970s, No religion. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.

Social Class
Table 3.4 assesses the risk of divorce by using social class variables as the
control. As we can see with the slope, each variable has produced statistically significant
results. Income variables were computed using the GSS variable CONINC, first by
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dividing the range into three separate groups, each increasing by the same amount. The
reference category for this group is Lower Income, which includes respondents with an
income of less than 60384 in inflation-adjusted constant 2000 dollars. Model E shows
that, relative to that group, respondents with an income from 60385 to 120385 have 25%
less of a risk of divorce. Further, respondents with an income of 120385 or above have
28% less of a risk of getting divorced compared to those with the lowest income. Finally,
a variable that represents respondents who perceive themselves as being in the middle
and upper classes indicates 29% less of a chance of getting divorced, relative to those in
the lower and working classes.
After income and social class variables have been controlled for, we may refer to
the slopes and odds ratios of the decades in Model E. Similarly with the results of Model
C, controlling for financial variables has very little effect on the risk of divorce
throughout the decades. However, results for the 1970s, 80s, 90s, and 2000s all remain
statistically significant and substantially similar to those before controls.
Table 3.4: Regression Model for Decades and Social Class

Constant
Eighties
Nineties
Two Thousands
Financial Variables
Middle Income
Higher Income
Middle/Upper class

B
-1.574***
0.365***
0.638***
0.697***

Model A
SE
0.026
0.033
0.032
0.03

Exp(B)
0.207
1.44
1.892
2.007

B
-1.432***
0.374***
0.652***
0.704***
-0.157***
-0.188***
-0.175***

Model E
SE Exp(B)
0.029
0.239
0.035
1.453
0.034
1.918
0.033
2.021
0.029
0.05
0.022

Note: GSS for 1972-2012. Dependent variable: If ever been married: every been legally
divorced? Control variable: decade 1970s, Income from 60384 and under in constant 2000
dollars, Lower/Working Class. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.
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0.855
0.829
0.839

Values
Finally, respondents’ attitudes regarding gender roles and premarital sex are
applied in Model F. Since each of these variables is an ordinal-level of measurement,
results increase or decrease with each additional level reported by respondents. The
variable FEFAM, asking whether respondents agree that men should be the achiever
outside of the home and women should take care of the home and children, produces
statistically significant results. According to these outcomes, each additional level
reported on FEFAM causes an 8.6% decrease in the risk of divorce. FECHLD, a variable
that asks respondents whether they believe that children are negatively affected when
mothers work outside of the home, does not result in statistically significant results. The
variable PREMARSX, measuring the degree to which respondents believe that sex before
marriage is wrong, has statistically significant, positive results. This means that, with
each additional level reported on PREMARSX, from thinking that premarital sex is
“Always Wrong” to “Almost Always Wrong” to “Sometimes Wrong” to “Not Wrong at
All”, respondents are 1.175 times, or have a 17.5% higher risk of getting divorced.
Once these attitudinal measures have been controlled for, I can analyze the slopes
and odds ratios between the decades in Models A and F. In Model F, each variable
endures some change, most notably the one in the 2000s, having gone from a 100%
increase in the risk of getting divorced in Model A to a 72% risk of getting divorced in
Model F. Thus, some part of the overall rise in divorce may be attributable to shifts in
respondents’ values.
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Table 3.5: Regression Model for Decades and Values

Constant
Eighties
Nineties
Two Thousands
Traditional Values
FEFAM
FECHLD
PREMARSX

Model A
Model F
B
SE
Exp(B)
B
SE Exp(B)
-1.574*** 0.026
.207 -1.598*** .105
.202
0.365*** 0.033
1.44
.253** .076
1.288
0.638*** 0.032
1.892
.506*** .072
1.658
0.697*** 0.03
2.007
.544*** .072
1.723
-.090*** .020
-.028 .019
.161*** .013

.914
.973
1.175

Note: GSS for 1972-2012. Dependent variable: If ever been married: ever been legally divorced?
Control variable: decade 1970s, Income from 60384 and under in constant 2000 dollars,
Lower/Working Class. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.

Full Model
Finally, Model G shows the effects of each control applied to the risk of divorce.
This first allows me to identify how these variables interact in respondents’ risk of getting
divorced. In some cases, the application of a control may change the results of another
variable, meaning that the control has accounted for some of the risk previously found for
that variable. Second, this allows me to determine how well the combination of these
variables explains the overall trend of divorce that is found throughout the decades.
Results indicate that, once every variable has been controlled for, respondents’ religious
affiliation continues to have statistically significant effects. Relative to respondents with
no religion, Evangelical Protestants have 1.763 times (or 76.3%) higher a risk of divorce
than those with no religion, a decrease of 5% when compared to the risk of Evangelicals
without the application of these variables (Model C). Mainline Protestants have 1.516
times (or 51.6%) higher a risk than those with no religion, which is actually in increase
from the results found in Model C. Although not as statistically significant as
Evangelicals and Mainline Protestants, Black Protestants have 1.513 times (or 51.3%) an
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increased risk of getting divorced than those with no religion. Respondents identifying
with Catholicism, Judaism, and other religions produce statistically non-significant
results, meaning that the significant results found in Model B have been controlled for,
similarly with those in Model C. The variable ATTEND produces statistically significant
results, with each additional level of religious attendance, respondents are about 7% less
likely to get divorced than those with less religious attendance.
The next group shows the effects of demographic variables on divorce and with
the application of control variables. Relative to white respondents, black respondents
have 24.6% decreased risk of getting divorced after other variables have been controlled
for. In Model D, before other variables are controlled for, black respondents have 1.283
times (or 28.3%) increased risk of getting divorced compared to white respondents,
indicating a significant change from the results of Model D to Model G. The category
“Other” in Model G shows a change of about 15% and, unlike in Model D, statistically
significant results. Compared to Model D, respondents with less than a high school
degree have a statistically non-significant risk of getting divorced, yet the variable “Some
College” continued to produce statistically significant results and thus implies a
relationship with divorce. Most notably, respondents living in the North region produced
statistically significant results, unlike those in Model D. Compared to respondents living
in the South region of the United States, respondents living in the North have a 17%
decreased risk of getting divorced.
Variables measuring respondents’ social class show statistically non-significant
results for both groups of income. Thus, the introduction of other controls reveals that
income does not have a strong effect on respondents’ risk of divorce. Results of
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respondents perceiving themselves to be in the middle or upper classes continue to be
statistically significant and maintain the same odds ratio value, indicating a robust
relationship.
Finally, variables measuring respondents’ attitudes on gender roles and premarital
sex indicate some minor changes when introduced to other controls. FEFAM produces
statistically significant results, and they remain relatively unaffected by the addition of
other controls. The variables FECHLD produces statistically significant results, unlike in
Model E, yet only changes by about 2%. Finally, the variable PREMARSX produces
statistically significant results and is not affected by the introduction of other controls.
Since the variables FEFAM and PREMARSX yield statistically significant results both
before and after the introduction of controls, their relationship with divorce is not
spurious.
To examine how the risk of divorce has changed throughout the course of the past
four decades, I compare the slopes and odds ratios of the decades in Models A and G.
With the introduction of these controls, the risk of divorce goes from 97% decreased to
73.7% decreased, both of which are statistically significant. Compared to the 1970s, the
1980s show an unaltered risk of divorce, meaning that the introduction of these variables
has done little to explain the trend of divorce in this decade. In the 1990s, respondents
had a 99% increased chance of getting divorced relative to the 1970s, a slight increase
with the addition of the control variables. Finally, in the 2000s, respondents had 2.139
times (or 113.9%) higher a risk of divorced than in the 1970s, another modest increase
with the application of these variables. Thus, in terms of explaining why America’s
divorce rate has risen since the 1970s, the combination of demographics, religion,
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economic and attitudinal variables examined here suggest that the rise is due to some
other, unstudied variable. Although these variables cannot explain the trend of divorce on
the societal level, macro-level variables set the groundwork for an ideological revolution
and micro-level variables help represent the populations that are most affected by
divorce.
Table 3.6: Regression Model for Decades, Religious Affiliation, Demographic
Variables, Social Class, and Values

Constant
Eighties
Nineties
Two Thousands
Religious Identification
Evangelical Protestant
Mainline Protestant
Black Protestant
Catholic
Jewish
Other Religion
ATTEND
Demographic Variables
Black
Other
Less Than High School
Some College
North
Financial Variables
Middle Income
Higher Income
Middle/Upper class
Traditional Values
FEFAM
FECHLD
PREMARSX

Model A
B
SE Exp(B)
-1.5740*** 0.026
0.207
0.365*** 0.033
1.44
0.638*** 0.032
1.892
0.697*** 0.03
2.007

B
-1.334***
0.377**
0.692***
0.761***

Model G
SE
Exp(B)
0.182
0.263
0.110
1.457
0.105
1.997
0.104
2.139

0.567***
0.416***
0.414**
0.049
0.042
0.148
-0.066***

0.073
0.067
0.124
0.067
0.134
0.116
0.009

1.763
1.516
1.513
1.050
1.043
1.159
0.936

-0.282**
-0.477***
-0.133
-0.340***
-0.186***

0.098
0.096
0.069
0.076
0.042

0.754
0.621
0.875
0.712
0.830

-0.057
-0.066
-0.149***

0.049
0.077
0.042

0.944
0.936
0.862

-0.049***
-0.098*
0.168***

0.025
0.027
0.020

0.952
0.907
1.183

Note: GSS for 1972-2012. Dependent variable: If ever been married: every been legally
divorced? Control variable: decade 1970s, no religion, white race, high school degree, south
region, Income from 60384 and under in constant 2000 dollars, Lower/Working Class. *p<.05.
**p<.01. ***p<.001.
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Interaction Variables
Decades and Religion
In order to further understand the relationship between these variables and the risk
of divorce in America, I create interaction terms for each group of attributes and values
with the decades. Out of each group of interaction term combinations, the results for
religion and decades and for values and decades are the most significant. Thus, it can be
said that the effects of demographics and social class variables on the risk of divorce have
remained largely unchanged over the years. Model H displays the interaction effects
between religion and decades and Model I includes the interaction effects of the variable
ATTEND. Next, Model J displays the interaction effects between values and decades. In
order to better understand the effects of the ideological revolution and provide a more
thorough analysis of the interaction term results in Model J, Figures 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9
feature cross-tabulations of FEFAM, FECHLD, and PREMARSX. I will first discuss
interaction term results between religion and decades without ATTEND.
In the 1970s, the risk of divorce without the effects of religion or values put
respondents at a 21.9% risk of divorce. In subsequent years, the risk of divorce increases,
with 1.517 (or 51.7%) higher a risk of divorce in the 1980s. The risk increases in the
1990s, with a 1.86 (or 86%) risk compared to the 1970s. Finally, the risk decreases
significantly, with 1.685 times (or 68.5%) the risk of divorce in the 2000s.
According to the main effects in this model, only respondents in the Catholic and
Jewish categories produce statistically significant results. Therefore, relative to those with
no religion, Catholics and Jews have an overall decreased risk of divorce and all other
categories have about the same risk of divorce. The interaction variables in Model H
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indicate statistically non-significant results for each category in the 1980s, meaning that
the effects of religion remained completely unchanged during this decade. The same is
true for the interaction variables combined with the 1990s, with the exception of Black
Protestants. Although it is statistically non-significant in the main effect, the effects of
Black Protestantism increase the risk of divorce for participants by nearly 1.5 times.
Relative to the 1970s, the effects of Black Protestantism in the 1980s not only diminish
the risk of divorce but actually reverse it, suggesting that the protective effects of Black
Protestantism gain strength form one decade to the next. Finally, the interaction results
between the variables Evangelical Protestant and two thousands, Mainline Protestant and
two thousands, Catholic and two thousands, and Jewish and two thousands produce
statistically significant results. First, this means that the effects of each religion on
divorce, while remaining unchanged in prior decades, do change in the 2000s. Relative to
the 1970s, the protective effects of Evangelical Protestantism have lessened and the risk
of divorce increases slightly. Further, respondents identifying with Mainline
Protestantism, while they previously had a significantly reduced risk of divorce relative
to those with no religion, actually have an increased risk of divorce in the 2000s. Thus,
the effects of Mainline Protestantism have been greatly reduced and the risk of divorce is
increased. Both the Catholic and Jewish categories have statistically significant results for
the main effect, yet, as previously mentioned, only produce significant results when
combined with the two thousands. Similarly with Mainline Protestants, the protective
features of Catholicism and Judaism that initially prevented these religions from getting
divorced is demolished and, relative to those with no religion, Catholics and Jews
actually have greatly increased risk of getting divorced in the 2000s. The interaction
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terms between other religions and decade produce no statistically significant results.
Thus, the effects of other religions on the risk of divorce have remained completely
unchanged in subsequent decades.
Model I displays the results of these same interaction terms, with the addition of
the variable ATTEND, which measures respondents’ religious activity. In other words,
adding this variable takes out the effect of participation and focuses primarily on the
effects of affiliation. Although very few of these results are statistically significant,
controlling for religious participation changes the direction of the interaction term results
in nearly every case besides Jewish, making the protective effects of affiliation with these
religions groups continue (unchanged, since they are statistically non-significant) to
reduce the risk of divorce. This finding suggests that the sole effect of affiliation for
Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants, Black Protestants, Catholics, and other
religions has caused respondents a reduced risk of divorce in the past and that this
relationship remains unchanged. However, the interaction term results for Judaism
produce quite different results once religious participation has been controlled for.
Relative to those with no religion, Judaism’s main effect appears to reduce respondents’
risk of divorce by about half. But, once religious participation is controlled for, the
direction of the relationship changes. Therefore, I can conclude that, even when religious
participation is controlled for, the protective effects of Judaism in the 1970s have been
greatly reduced in subsequent years.
The pattern that was initially found in the combination of religious categories and
the two thousands disappears when religious participation is controlled for, suggesting
that the relationship between divorce and religion is due to respondents’ religious

	
  

	
   67	
  

activity. However, the results for Black Protestant and Jewish stand out in Model I. Since
both sets of results are negative for Black Protestants, I conclude that the effects of
affiliation and participation both reduce the risk of divorce. However, results become
increasingly significant for Black Protestants in Model I, implying that, relative to those
with no religion, the effects of affiliation with Black Protestantism on the risk of divorce
have gotten increasingly strong over time. Further, in each other case, controlling for
participation in Model I caused the direction of the relationship between divorce and
religion to become negative. This is not the case for the Jewish category, which maintains
nearly the exact positive correlation as was found before this control, suggesting that
these results are legitimate.
To determine whether the addition of ATTEND has significant effects on
respondents’ risk of divorce, I examine the results of Model H and Model I. First, a
comparison between the decade coefficients shows that, while only slight, the addition of
ATTEND has explained the divorce rate to some degree. The slope of each decade in
Model H slightly decreases in Model I, while the Exp(B) gets slightly closer to a value of
1 in Model I. Further, the addition of ATTEND significantly changes the results found
across most religious groups, suggesting that religious participation plays a role in the
risk of divorce.
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Table 3.7: Interaction Regression Model Between Decades and Religious Affiliation
Model H
Model I
B

Sig

Exp(B)

B

Sig

Exp(B)

-1.52***
0.417**
0.621***
0.522***

0.000
0.001
0.00
0.00

0.219
1.517
1.86
1.685

-1.420***
0.402***
0.601***
0.499***

0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000

0.242
1.495
1.824
1.647

0.135
-0.023
0.232
-0.491***
-0.81**
0.161

0.246
0.832
0.068
0.00
0.001
0.495

1.144
0.977
1.261
0.612
0.445
1.175

0.594***
0.362**
0.738***
0.004
-0.595*
0.497*
-0.136***

0.000
0.002
0.000
0.971
0.015
0.039
0.000

1.811
1.436
2.091
1.004
0.551
1.644
0.873

Interaction Variables
EightiesXEvangelical Protestant
NinetiesXEvangelical Protestant
TwothousandsXEvangelical Protestant

0.002
0.071
0.324*

0.986
0.606
0.012

1.002
1.073
1.383

-0.091
-0.094
0.173

0.556
0.525
0.212

0.913
0.910
1.189

EightiesXMainline Protestant
NinetiesXMainline Protestant
TwothousandsXMainline Protestant

-0.125
0.118
0.315*

0.366
0.372
0.01

0.882
1.125
1.37

-0.217
-0.044
0.160

0.137
0.756
0.219

0.805
0.957
1.173

-0.259
-0.335*
-0.249

0.103
0.033
0.09

0.772
0.715
0.78

-0.378*
-0.524**
-0.437**

0.026
0.002
0.005

0.685
0.592
0.646

EightiesXCatholic
NinetiesXCatholic
TwothousandsXCatholic

0.08
0.14
0.284*

0.572
0.303
0.025

1.084
1.15
1.329

-0.038
-0.083
0.031

0.803
0.572
0.818

0.963
0.921
1.032

EightiesXJewish
NinetiesXJewish
TwothousandsXJewish

0.378
0.503
0.709*

0.205
0.082
0.01

1.459
1.654
2.032

0.372
0.458
0.626*

0.215
0.117
0.025

1.451
1.581
1.871

EightiesXOther Religion
NinetiesXOther Religion
TwothousandsXOther Religion

-0.255
-0.395
-0.189

0.374
0.141
0.463

0.775
0.674
0.828

-0.292
-0.517
-0.349

0.317
0.059
0.184

0.746
0.596
0.706

Main Effect
Decades
Constant
Eighties
Nineties
Two Thousands
Religious Variables
Evangelical Protestant
Mainline Protestant
Black Protestant
Catholic
Jewish
Other Religion
ATTEND

EightiesXBlack Protestant
NinetiesXBlack Protestant
TwothousandsXBlack Protestant

EightiesXATTEND
0.029 0.060
1.029
NinetiesXATTEND
0.048*** 0.001
1.049
TwothousandsXATTEND
0.052*** 0.000
1.053
Note: GSS for 1972-2012. Dependent variable: If ever been married: ever been legally divorced?
Excluded category/comparison group: decade 1970s, no religion. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.
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Decades and Values
In order to fully express the strength of this ideological revolution, I conduct
cross-tabulations between the years and FEFAM, FECHLD, and PREMARSX. Figures
3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 display the results of these cross-tabulations. To summarize, in 1972,
65.8% of respondents agreed that it was better for men to work and women to stay at
home. Forty years later, only 40.5% of respondents agreed with this statement. Similarly,
49% of respondents agreed that working mothers do not hurt children in 1972, whereas
65.5% agreed with this statement in 2012. Finally, in 1972, 48.4% of respondents
believed that sex before marriage was either “Always Wrong” or “Almost Always
Wrong”, while only 27.5% of respondents reported this in 2012. Clearly, the distributions
of results for these three variables have been greatly changed over the years.
Figure 3.7: Cross Tabulation of Year and FEFAM
60.00%	
  
50.00%	
  
40.00%	
  

Strongly	
  Agree	
  

30.00%	
  

Agree	
  
Disagree	
  

20.00%	
  

Strongly	
  Disagree	
  

0.00%	
  

1977	
  
1985	
  
1986	
  
1988	
  
1989	
  
1990	
  
1991	
  
1993	
  
1994	
  
1996	
  
1998	
  
2000	
  
2002	
  
2004	
  
2006	
  
2008	
  
2010	
  
2012	
  

10.00%	
  

Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. FEFAM, “It is much better for everyone
involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and
family.”
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Figure 3.8: Cross Tabulation of Year and FECHLD
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Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. FECHLD, “A working mother can establish
just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.”

Figure 3.9: Cross Tabulation of Year and PREMARSX
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Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. PREMARSX, “If a man and woman have sex
relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only
sometimes, or not wrong at all?”
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Since the 1970s, the distributions of respondents’ attitudes regarding gender roles
and premarital sex have changed immensely (Figures 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9). Table 3.8 displays
the effects of these views on the risk of divorce over the years. In the sig column, it is
clear that, although there may have been some sort of ideological revolution over the
course of the past forty years, the effects that respondents’ attitudes have on the risk of
divorce has remained completely unchanged.
Table 3.8: Interaction Regression Model Between Decades and FEFAM, FECHLD,
and PREMARSX
Model J
Main Effects
Decade
Constant
Eighties
Nineties
Two Thousands
Views
FEFAM
FECHLD
PREMARSX
View Interactions
EightiesXFEFAM
NinetiesXFEFAM
TwothousandsXFEFAM
EightiesXFECHLD
NinetiesXFECHLD
TwothousandsXFECHLD
EightiesXPREMARSX
NinetiesXPREMARSX
TwothousandsXPREMARSX

B

Sig.

Exp(B)

-1.594***
0.243
0.44
0.604

0.00
0.563
0.271
0.124

0.203
1.276
1.552
1.829

-0.081
-0.094
0.211

0.393
0.233
0.00

0.922
0.91
1.235

0.021
-0.037
-0.004

0.846
0.716
0.971

1.021
0.964
0.996

0.001
0.074
0.1

0.991
0.382
0.232

1.001
1.077
1.106

-0.025
-0.009
-0.101

0.698
0.885
0.1

0.975
0.991
0.904

Note: GSS for 1972-2012. Dependent variable: If ever been married: ever been legally divorced?
Excluded category/comparison group: decade 1970s. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.
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Chapter 4: Discussion and Conclusions
The purpose of this study has first been to identify the social influences present
during this ideological revolution, and further, whether they contributed to the rise in the
divorce rate. Second, the study has attempted to draw more definitive conclusions
regarding the role of micro-level factors in the risk of divorce. Using a number of
variables from the GSS, a trend survey that measures and monitors societal change in the
United States, I studied the effects of micro-level factors such as age at first marriage,
race, education and region on the risk of divorce, both at the time of the revolution and
present-day.
My research focused on social trends that took place from about the 1960s to
present day. The effects that ideological changes had on behavior and values opposed
traditional notions of the family, and ultimately lead to an increase in the divorce rate.
Influences such as the growing emphasis on “the self”, the entrance of women into the
workforce, the availability of birth control and contraception, transformed religious
teachings, and the option of no-fault divorce laws have all theoretically played a part in
the acceptance of divorce in America.
After conducting a number of tests on the effects of micro-level variables on the
risk of divorce, I found that, when applied separately, factors such as religion, age at first
marriage, race, education, social class, region, and values influence the individual’s risk
of divorce. However, many of these correlations became non-significant once other
controls were applied. To get a sense of how these effects have changed over time, I
created interaction variables that combine decades with religion and with values. Results
indicated that the effects of religion variables such as Black Protestantism, Judaism, and
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the level of religious participation on the risk of divorce have changed over the course of
the past few decades. Further, while respondents’ attitudes regarding gender roles and
premarital sex have had effects on the risk of divorce, their influences have remained
relatively unchanged over time. Analyses revealed that, while these variables produce
intriguing results and suggest areas for future study, they are unable to fully explain the
trend of divorce.
The Start of an Ideological Revolution
Over the course of the past few centuries, the world has experienced many
changes within the social sphere, including those of ideologies, values, and norms.
Accompanying these changes was the emergence of an entirely new mindset, one that
embodied the values of individualism and modernization. Yet these advancements also
brought developments such as a rise in the divorce rate and a change in the institution of
marriage all together. In a time of complete social upheaval, the 1960s brought about a
new way of thinking that emphasized the importance of the individual, placing personal
importance over that of the family (Cherlin 2009). Events and ideas such as women’s
entrance into the workforce, the growing acceptance of birth control and contraception,
the adoption of no-fault divorce laws, and the transformation of religious teachings can
be credited for having some degree of influence in the rate of divorce (O’Neil 1967;
Wheeler 1974; Wright and Stetson 1978; Halem 1980; Weitzman 1985; Riley 1991;
Morgan 1991; Herman 1992; Kent 1992; Furstenberg 1994; Nakonezny et al. 1995;
Vlosky and Monroe 2002; Shoen and Canudas-Romo 2006; Cherlin 2009; Yenor 2011;
Schwartz and Han 2014). The institution of marriage began to shift from the strict,
traditional American ideal that it had embodied for generations, into a less restrictive,
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accepting ideology that rejected divorce far less than before. Yet, these macro-level
factors cannot take full credit for the rate of divorce; in order to fully understand the
divorce revolution on both a societal and an individual level, we must identify how
micro-level factors such as religion, age at first marriage, race, education, region, social
class, and values affected the risk of divorce, both at that time and also today. Previous
literature on the relationships between these variables and divorce has been inconclusive.
Data Gathering/Analysis
By conducting frequencies, cross tabulations, regression models, and interaction
terms on variables from the General Social Survey that measure the micro-level factors
mentioned earlier, I attempted to measure the degree to which each variable helps explain
the risk of divorce since the 1970s. After the initial analysis of decades and the rate of
divorce, a number of control groups were added in. First, they were applied separately for
the purpose of examining how variables affect divorce independently. Then, they were
combined into the same model in order to regulate spurious results and to determine how
each variable interacts with controls to explain the overall trend of divorce. Finally, each
religion category and each value variable were combined with the decades, allowing me
to identify how the overall effects of these variables on the risk of divorce have changed
over time.
Micro-Level Effects on an Individual’s Risk of Divorce
The Rise of Divorce Across the Decades
Having just identified some of the main events and ideas that influenced the initial
rise in the divorce rate, I categorize variables that I believe represent these changes on a
social level, such as respondents’ opinions on whether obtaining a divorce should be
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easier, more difficult or stay the same as it is now (DIVLAW). Figures 3.1 through 3.6
display the patterns associated with divorce, including variables that measure both the
divorce rate and also certain attitudes regarding divorce. Although many of these
variables are not asked consistently enough to be included in the final analysis, they
reflect changes in respondents’ opinions towards divorce throughout different, key points
in time. In general, they reveal respondents’ increasingly relaxed attitudes towards the
institution of marriage. The variable MARITAL indicates an increase in the overall
number of respondents who choose not to get married, while the variable “divorced”
shows, among respondents that have been married at one point, a steady increase in the
rate of divorce. Attitudinal measures indicate that respondents generally see divorce as
the best, easiest solution to solve marital problems.
Further, I identified twelve independent variables that are later measured against
“divorced” and the decades, first separately and then all together. Used as the baseline
model throughout most of the study, Table 3.1 includes only the recoded variable
“decades” and displays the risk of divorce from one decade to the next. As has been
commented on in numerous studies about marriage patterns, the rate of divorce increased
by nearly 50% from the 1970s to the 1980s, 89% from the 1970s to the 1990s, and 100%
into the 2000s. This sharp increase into the 1980s may be due, as the historical overview
in Chapter 1 indicates, to the implementation of no-fault divorce laws in most states
(Wright and Stetson 1978; Nakonezny et al. 1995; Vlosky and Monroe 2002). Although
it is commonly believed that the divorce rate continues to increase, it has actually leveled
off in recent years (Shoen and Canudas-Romo 2006:753). This fact can be explained
through Schwartz and Han’s (2014) diffusion theory. While the rate of divorce was
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relatively steady up until about mid-century, the ideological and social changes
previously mentioned caused acceptance to increase, eventually reaching a “critical
mass” (Schwartz and Han 2014:62). Once this mass had been reached, the acceptance of
divorce sped up and the divorce rate skyrocketed. However, once the ideas that had
initially caused people to get divorced became more widely accepted, such as women’s
entrance into the workforce, the conflict that originally led to divorce lessened and thus,
the divorce rate did as well.
The Ideological Revolution’s Effects on Individual-Level Attributes
The Effects of Religion on Divorce
In order to measure the risk of divorce on the individual level, variables were
analyzed throughout five different models, the first four measuring the effects of religion,
demographics, finances and values on divorce separately, and the fifth combining each
variable together. Table 3.2 includes “divorced”, the decades, respondents’ religious
identification, and participation. Model A displays the results of the baseline model and
includes only the decades; Model B shows the results of the decades with each of the six
categories for religion, leaving out “None” for the purpose of using it as the reference
category; Model C shows the results of the decades, each category for religion, and the
variable ATTEND, which measures the level of respondents’ religious activity.
Model B shows that, compared to those with no religion, respondents identifying
with Evangelical Protestantism, Mainline Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism all
produce statistically significant results, whereas respondents identifying with Black
Protestantism and other religions do not. Since the results of the first two categories,
Evangelical and Mainline, have positive slopes, they contradict what many may believe,

	
  

	
   77	
  

that more religious people are less likely to get divorced. Although a definitive analysis
cannot yet be made, these results fall into line with the ideas introduced by Cherlin
(2009), that many churches transformed their conservative teachings in order to
accommodate the rising number of members seeking a divorce. In addition, respondents
affiliating with more fundamentalist religious groups may get married earlier, a factor
that has been associated with a higher risk of divorce (Kposowa 1998; Glass and Levchak
2014). Glass and Levchak (2014) found that highly conservative Protestant communities
have an increased risk of divorce. Potential explanations include the fact that they get
married at younger ages and are given fewer resources to improve marriage quality later
in life.
In order to determine whether the variable ATTEND plays a significant role in the
risk of divorce, I added it as an additional coefficient in Model C. Controlling for
religious participation causes the results to be largely based on affiliation alone. With the
application of ATTEND, Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants and Black
Protestants all produce statistically significant results. The effect that the participation
control has on Evangelical Protestants and Mainline Protestants is the same, yet the size
of the group becomes bigger. In other words, the effect of religion on the risk of divorce
is stronger once I account for levels of participation. Since Black Protestantism had
statistically non-significant results in Model B, this change suggests that their increased
risk of divorce is due to the higher amount of religious involvement that they have,
relative to the non-religious people that they are being compared to. Although they yield
opposite results than those of Black Protestants, similar conclusions can be drawn for the
categories Catholic and Jewish. Since their results become statistically non-significant
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with the application of ATTEND, it is possible that the risk of divorce for these two
groups is not due to their actual religion, but instead to religious activity. Before the
variable ATTEND is introduced, both Catholics and Jews have statistically significant,
negative results, meaning that they have a decreased chance of getting divorced.
However, since Model C shows statistically non-significant results for these categories, I
can say that controlling for religious activity explains much of the relationship found in
Model B.
The Effects of Demographic Variables on Divorce
When controls for age at first marriage are introduced in Table 3.3, the results
indicate a strong negative relationship between respondents who get married after the age
of 21 and the risk of divorce, results which support Glass and Levchak’s (2014) recently
discussed theory. Although this variable was not asked consistently enough to be
included in the full model described later on, these results not only contribute
significantly to the limited body of research previously done on this topic but they also
agree with the results found in other studies, that younger couples have a higher risk of
divorce. Although each control variable does not yield statistically significant results, a
comparison of the odds ratios between each decade coefficient in Models A and D show
that, if the distribution of these attributes had remained the same in the 1980s, 1990s and
2000s as they were in the 1970s, then the divorce rate would have risen even more
substantially. As displayed in Table 3.3, the application of these controls causes the
likelihood of divorce to increases by as much as 161% in 2000. This therefore suggests
that changes in population characteristics from the 1970s into subsequent decades have
resulted in a muted increase in the divorce rate.
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The Effects of Social Class Variables on Divorce
The next group of independent variables is social class, which is represented with
three recoded levels of income and with respondents’ perceptions of their own social
class position. Relative to respondents in the lowest group of income, those in the middle
and upper groups both have at least a 25% reduced risk of divorce. This supports the
hypothesis that Kposowa (1998) gives, that the reduction of financial stress in a family
lessens conflict and marital breakdown. The perception of higher class also has an effect
on the risk of divorce, as can be seen in Table 3.4. Although this finding was not
specifically addressed in Kposowa’s study, the fact that respondents perceive themselves
as being in a higher class may have an effect on their risk of divorce. This suggests that
income may in fact be related to divorce, but a definitive conclusion cannot yet be made.
The Continued Alignment of Traditional Values
Although variables measuring respondents’ attitudes on the topics mentioned in
the literature review were limited, the available ones reveal significant trends (Table 3.5).
As expected, FEFAM, the variable asking respondents whether they agree that women
should leave controlling the country up to men, is highly correlated with a decrease in the
risk of divorce. Traditional values like FEFAM maintain that woman should stay in the
house and that men are responsible for providing for the family, a scenario that, once
again, places women as the vulnerable, dependent party. However, definitive conclusions
about this variable’s relationship with divorce cannot yet be made until it is added to the
full model.
As I noted in the literature review, birth control and contraception have had
significant effects on the ability of women to separate the act of sex from the
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commitments of children and marriage (Yenor 2011). What had once been used by men
as a weapon to secure the dependence of women is now seen as something far less
obliging (Yenor 2011). The ability of women to control their reproduction has eliminated
the binding nature of sex, and has become far more acceptable in recent decades. This
liberated mindset does seem to have an effect on the risk of divorce, as seen with the
variable PREMARSX in Table 3.5. With each additional level that respondents report on
this variable, they face a 17.5% increased risk of getting divorced. Yet, similarly with the
results of FEFAM, I cannot draw definitive conclusions until other variables have been
controlled for.
Explaining the Trend of Divorce In a Full Model
Factors Associated With the Risk of Divorce
On an individual level, these micro-level results help me understand which
attributes place people at a higher risk of divorce. Getting married before the age of 21
may, as hypothesized in other works (Kposowa 1998; Glass and Levchak 2014),
contribute to people’s risk of getting divorced, while Sweezy and Tiefenthaler (1996)
hypothesized that higher educational attainment decreases the risk of divorce. However, a
definitive analysis must include the application of each control group to avoid spurious
results. Table 3.6 displays the results of how these variables interact to affect the overall
risk of divorce. Once variables are introduced to other controls, much of the data
previously found to be statistically significant becomes non-significant.
With the introduction of other control variables, the results of religion remain the
same. This suggests that the relationship previously discovered is not due to some third
variable, and that Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants and Black Protestants are
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actually at an overall increased risk of divorce, while respondents who attend religious
activities more often are at a lower risk. These results support those found by Vaaler et al.
(2009), that wives identifying with evangelical and fundamentalist groups are more
willing to get divorced if their husbands disappoint them. The results of ATTEND also
agree with what Mahoney (2010) and Vaaler et al. (2009) found, that, the more
frequently people attend religious services or activities, the lower their overall risk of
divorce. Among each of the religious groups mentioned earlier, Conservative Protestants
have among the highest risk of divorce, relative to people with no religion. This finding
coincides exactly with those of Glass and Levchak (2014), who found that Conservative
Protestant communities have a higher risk than others to get divorced. This study later
explained that this relationship may be due to other factors, yet since the results of my
study control for other variables, we may conclude that this relationship may, in fact, be
legitimate. This relationship may also help to explain the higher divorce rates found in
Southern regions, since, as Glass and Levchak (2014) further suggest, the South contains
a higher concentration of Protestants.
Unlike in Table 3.4, the results of income have no effect on the risk of divorce
once all of the other controls are added to the equation. However, Kposowa’s theory
(1998), that reduced financial stress results in less familial conflict, is not entirely
discredited, since the results of respondents who perceived themselves to be in the middle
or upper classes remain statistically significant. Although this variable is based on where
respondents choose to place themselves, it potentially suggests the power of perception in
influencing one’s wellbeing and calls for further research.
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As before, the results of FEFAM and PREMARSX continue to produce
statistically significant results even when other variables are controlled for. Thus, it is
possible that a relationship between attitudes regarding gender roles and premarital sex
and divorce may exist. According to Table 3.6, for each additional reported level for the
variable FEFAM, the risk of divorce decreases by 4.8%. The extremely traditional nature
of the gender roles that are associated with this variable would logically reject the option
of divorce, since it fails to fit into the image of a happy, functional family. This
traditional mindset is consistent with Schwartz and Han’s (2014) application of Becker’s
exchange theory (1974), that the gains of marriage are maximized when benefits
associated with gender roles are utilized, and the risk of divorce is therefore heightened
when this balance of power is challenged. Respondents who agree that men should
provide and women should stay in the home clearly adhere to these traditional gender
roles. The fact that they have lower divorce rates implies that they have avoided
challenging the balance of power. Although the values and formation of the typical
American family may have changed over the past few decades, the ideals held by the
older, more traditional family remain the same.
The variable PREMARSX also continues to produce significant results, implying
a strong relationship between opinions on premarital sex and the risk of divorce. With
each additional level reported by respondents, the risk of divorce increases by 18.3%.
Halem (1980) applies conflict theory, arguing that human beings are constantly at battle
with society and the only thing keeping the family together is the necessity of humans to
control their sexual desires. Starting with the end of the need for people to control
themselves, the dissolution of marriage began. These results can also be seen through a
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functionalist perspective, which stems from Halem’s conflict theory. One of the
traditional functions of marriage is in the rearing of children, accomplished through the
act of sex. This role allotted marriage a considerable degree of purpose, yet this purpose
hinged upon that particular function. Once birth control and contraception deemphasized
this notion, the functions originally associated with this purpose declined, simultaneously
weakening the function of marriage in society.
One of the topics discussed in the literature review had to do with the effects of
women’s entrance into the labor force. Unfortunately, there was a very limited range of
options to measure this trend. The variable FECHLD asks respondents whether they
believe that women working outside of the home are able to develop relationships with
their children. Although this variable did not produce significant results in Table 3.5, it
does in Table 3.6 with the application of other controls. This finding suggests that
respondents who disagree that working women are able to create relationships with their
children are at a decreased risk of divorce. This supports Rogers’s (2004) economical
independence theory, which maintains that women begin to perceive divisions within the
family as unequal once they begin contributing to the overall income. In other words,
families who are against the participation of women in the workforce are able to preserve
these divisions of power without question, since women are unable to contribute
financially.
Applied separately, these variables offer some significant insight into which
attributes contribute to the risk of divorce. However, many of these results become nonsignificant when applied together. By using the equation mentioned in the Methods
section, I can determine how well these controls explain the divorce rate by measuring
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the change in decade coefficients once the controls have been applied (see page 44).
These controls explain the Constant by 15.25%, thus only accounting for about one-fifth
of the overall divorce rate in the 1970s. For the 1980s, this equation results with -3.29%,
which means that the correlates used in this study have changed in such a way from the
1970s to the 1980s that the divorce rate would have been 3.29% higher if the population
in the 1980s had the same characteristics as in the 1970s. Using this explanation and the
results of the 1990s and 2000s (-8.464% and -9.182%, respectively), I can say that, if
these variables had not changed in subsequent decades, then the divorce rate would be
this percent higher than in the 1970s. However, these percentages are not high enough to
conclude that the variables fully explain the rise in divorce.
The Effects of the Protective “Umbrella” of Religion
In order to study how the effects of particular variables on the divorce rate have
changed over time, I create interaction terms combining “decades” and a number of
attributes. Similarly with the regression models, I conduct interaction tests for religion
both with and also without the variable ATTEND, for the purpose of determining how
religious participation affects the risk of divorce in different religions and also whether
these effects have changed over time. Without controlling for participation, a pattern
among the interaction between religion and the decade “Two Thousands” appears. Since
this pattern disappears in the next model, I can attribute it to ATTEND. In other words,
the fact that the combination of most religions and the decade two thousands produced
positive, statistically significant results that later disappear implies that respondents’ level
of religious participation accounts for the risk of divorce. This finding supports results
discussed earlier in this section, as well as the idea presented by Cherlin (2009), that
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churches changed their ideologies to accommodate to the rising divorce rate. Once the
effects of these church ideologies have been controlled for with the application of
ATTEND, these results are no longer statistically significant and have thus been
explained. The disappearance of statistically significant results among the majority of
these categories in Model I suggests that the effects of religious affiliation alone on
divorce have remained unchanged over the years.
The combinations of decades with the variable ATTEND, which measures the
frequency of respondents’ religious participation, seals the relevance of Cherlin’s idea
(2009) to this study. Relative to the 1970s, the effects of religious participation on the
risk of divorce remain unchanged in the 1980s. However, the 1990s and 2000s both
produce highly statistically significant results. Thus, the protective effects of attending
religious services on the risk of divorce have, with some suddenness, been greatly
reduced prior to the 1970s. As Cherlin (2009) explains, faced with the growing divorce
rate, many churches were forced to change their policies and teachings (Cherlin 2009).
Thus, as these results indicate, church membership during the earlier half of the twentieth
century reinforced the traditional, stereotypical American family; yet as churches altered
their ideologies, the option of divorce became less unwarranted, explaining the
decreasing effects that church attendance has had on the risk of divorce. This original
family notion supported by the church supports the initially negative effects of ATTEND
that are displayed in Model C in Table 3.2 and as the main effect in Table 3.7. Compared
to respondents with no religion, those attending religious services have a decreased risk
of divorce in the 1970s, yet the effects of this variable are diminished in subsequent
decades.
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The two categories whose results continue to stand out in Model I are those of
Black Protestantism and Judaism. Relative to the 1970s, when Black Protestantism
increased the risk of divorce by two times relative to those with no religion, subsequent
decades indicate that the effects of Black Protestantism diminish the risk of divorce. The
results from the combination of the decades and Black Protestantism not only produce
statistically significant results for all three recoded variables, but they also get
progressively significant as the decades increase. As explained earlier in the regression
analysis (Table 3.2), the effect of Black Protestantism on the risk of divorce becomes
significant with the addition of ATTEND. Similarly with Table 3.2, the slope of the main
effect of Black Protestantism in Table 3.7 is positive. Yet, the results of interaction terms
suggest that the effects of Black Protestantism have become stronger and prevent the risk
of divorce in subsequent decades. This finding can be explained by a more recent
analysis of the results found by Peck (1982). This study suggests that, upon gaining their
freedom, Protestantism offered Blacks a sense of community in a group that would not
reject them, like white Christianity did. However, the Black Protestant church is weaker
now than it was in the 1970s, making this explanation slightly outdated. These findings
can thus be explained through the secularization of America. After the Civil Rights
movement, the emphasis originally placed on the importance of being an active member
of the black church was reduced. Once it became acceptable to be black and not part of a
church, members who belonged but did not believe or behave accordingly fell away,
leaving only those who continued to faithfully follow the church’s teachings. Through
their dedication to church values, these individuals may gain certain benefits, such as
support, that make them less prone to divorce. People who remain as members of the
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back church may well be distinct both from other African Americans and also from other
Christians, since their continued participation requires dedication to certain ideologies.
Thus, although church participation has been controlled for in this analysis, I believe it is
possible that affiliation alone could lead to a strengthening of the values taught by the
church, since members would need to have a strong commitment to it already. Although
there is limited research on this topic, Peck (1982) suggests that the dedication of
members to the Black Protestant church provides couples with the resources they need to
decrease their risk of divorce.
Since the results of the interaction terms for decade and Jewish produced the same
results, even with the addition of ATTEND, we must assume that the positive
relationship between the risk of divorce and Judaism is real and due to something besides
participation. Although the results found in Table 3.2 imply that the risk of divorce
among Jewish respondents is due to participation, the fact that the results of Models H
and I are so similar suggests a need for some other explanation. In the 1970s, Judaism
reduced the risk of divorce by about half. However, the results of this interaction indicate
that in subsequent decades, the preventative characteristics associated with Judaism have
not only been greatly reduced, but have in fact been reversed. As of the 2000s, Judaism’s
influence actually increases the risk of divorce. This difference presents the most drastic
change among all of the variables. Unlike many of the other religions mentioned,
Judaism has never considered divorce to be a sin; on the contrary, “at times divorce is
appropriate and possibly even a Jewish and moral good” (Broyde and Ausubel
2005:229). The switch from Judaism’s preventing divorce to making it more likely is not
entirely unfounded. As explained through an analysis of a survey conducted in 1990, the
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percent of college graduates among the Jewish population was 55%, compared to 24% of
the non-Jewish population and this number goes up in subsequent decades. This growth
in the percentage of the Jewish population attending college may have resulted in a
heightened amount of women entering the workforce, which has previously been cited as
a cause of the increased divorce rate (Rogers 2004; Schwartz and Han 2014). Further, in
a study conducted by Broyde and Ausubel (2005) from the 1970s, it was found that Jews
tend to be more liberal than non-Jews on topics such as premarital sex, which could
potentially contribute to the acceptance of divorce by the Jewish population. If the Jewish
mindset was liberal in the 1970s, then their heightened risk of divorce may be due to an
increase in this liberated mentality. Thus, unlike many other religions, participation and
church teachings cannot be credited with the divorce rate but instead, a change in the
Jewish mindset.
The Traditional Mindset
In order to determine the degree to which respondents’ traditional values have
changed over the years, I conduct a cross-tabulation of year and FEFAM, FECHLD and
PREMARSX (Tables 3.8, 3.9, 3.10). From the year 1972 to 2012, the number of
respondents agreeing that it was better for men to work and for women to stay at home is
nearly cut in half. Respondents that believe working mothers have no negative impact on
their relationship with their child also increased almost 20 percentage points over the
course of forty years. Finally, respondents that believe sex before marriage is “Always
Wrong” or “Almost Always Wrong” dropped by 20 percentage points as well. Clearly,
some sort of significant change has occurred over the course of the past forty years.
However, results in Table 3.8 show that, relative to the main effect, each of the
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interaction terms produced statistically non-significant results. This means that, while
changes in people’s attitudes may have resulted in an ideological revolution, the effects
that these traditional mindsets have had on the risk of divorce has remained unchanged
over the years. Given that respondents feeling strongly about FEFAM, FECHLD, and
PREMARSX seem to fall on the highly conservative and highly liberal ends of the
spectrum, these findings suggest that those who continue to have traditional mindsets
over the years maintain their marital status and vise versa, or that the divorce rate is due
to other, less extreme variables.
Shortcomings in This Study
Although the General Social Survey provided me with convenient, accessible
data, it also caused a number of obstacles. The process of choosing my variables revolved
almost entirely around the consistency with which they were asked since the start of
survey. Many of the variables that encompassed what I wanted to measure were either
not asked with enough consistency or were not representative of the entire population.
This is especially true with the attitude and opinion-based questions, most of which were
only used a handful of times. Variables such as “MARFREE”, which asks respondents
whether they agree or disagree with the statement, “Personal freedom is more important
than the companionship of marriage”, would have been useful in the discussion of
Americans’ emphasis on personal freedom. “DECCHURH”, which asks respondents to
state how important they think the “Teachings of your church or synagogue” are in
making decisions about everyday life, would have been useful in discussing the
importance of religious teachings in the decision to get divorced.
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Most of the variables that have been asked since the 1970s have also been
changed or reworded, skewing their distributions. For example, the variable RACE,
which is the most consistently used race variable available, only has the options “White”,
“Black” and “Other” until fairly recently, categories which clearly do not capture the
diversity that is America. Similarly with religion, a more inclusive array of categories is
not even offered until the year 1998.
Finally, and most fundamentally, the General Social Survey presents a challenge
for my dependent variable measure. Since these measures cannot follow the same people
or monitor the changes that take place in their lives, I cannot be sure that the event of
their divorce is preceded by the measures of current statuses such as income, education,
religion, etc. In other words, respondents may have divorced in the past, yet since then,
have changed religions, attained a higher religious degree, and have a higher income.
Since these measures would have come after the event of their divorce, I cannot say with
any certainty that the cause of their divorce is attributable to their most recent
demographic statuses.
Recommendations for Future Research
Future studies could attempt to identify the variables that I did not study, and
further help explain the divorce rate. For example, I did not include variables having to
do with children, which may have a significant effect on the leveling out of the divorce
rate. This study was further limited by the fact that some people may have had numerous
divorces, yet present GSS variables are unable to measure that. If possible, having a
variable that measures the amount of divorces per individual may help to explain patterns
in the divorce rate and in the risk of certain individuals to get divorced repeatedly. Using
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GSS as my primary source of information created some obstacles, since many variables
were not asked consistently enough to be included in the final analysis. Although I was
able to find demographic variables that are used consistently enough, many of the
attitudinal variables would have been helpful for providing insight into the importance of
religious teachings, traditional family values, the degree to which respondents value their
personal freedom more than their family, opinions regarding the difficulty of obtaining a
divorce, etc. Future studies could find other, more commonly used variables to measure
how attitudes and opinions affect an individuals’ risk of getting divorced, and also that
better explain the trend of divorce, something that has become a regular occurrence and a
characteristic of the American mindset (Cherlin 2009).
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Appendix
General Social Survey variables
AGEWED- independent variable
4a. If every married: How old were you when you first married?
12-90
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987,
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 2006
ATTEND- independent variable
105. How often do you attend religious services?
0=NEVER, 1=LT ONCE A YEAR, 2=ONCE A YEAR, 3=SEVRL TIMES A YR,
4=ONCE A MONTH, 5=2-3X A MONTH, 6=NRLY EVERY WEEK, 7=EVERY
WEEK, 8=MORE THAN ONCE A WK, 9=DK, NA
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987,
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010,
2012
BlackProt- independent variable
Recoded from Reltrad, “Black Protestant.”
Yes=1, no=0.
Blackrace- independent variable
Recoded from RACE, “Black.”
Yes=1, no=0.
CatholicTrad- independent variable
Recoded from Reltrad, “Catholic.”
Yes=1, no=0.
CLASS- independent variable
185a. If you were asked to use one of four names for your social class, which would you
say you belong in: the lower class, the working class, the middle class, or the upper class?
1= LOWER CLASS, 2=WORKING CLASS, 3=MIDDLE CLASS, 4=UPPER CLASS,
5=NO CLASS, 0=IAP, 8=DK, 9=NA
1972, 1973, 1074, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987,
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010,
2012
CONINC- independent variable
1657. Inflation-adjusted family income- standardized at 2000 constant dollars
DEGREE- independent variable
19. If finished 9th-12th grade: Did you ever get a high school diploma or a GED
certificate?
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0=LT HIGH SCHOOL, 1=HIGH SCHOOL, 2=JUNIOR COLLEGE, 3=BACHELOR,
4=GRADUATE, 8=DK, 9=NA
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987,
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010,
2012
DENOM- independent variable
104a. If Protestant: What specific denomination is that, if any?
10=AM BAPTIST ASSO, 11=AM BAPT CH IN USA, 12=NAT BAPT CONV OF AM
13=NAT BAPT CONV USA, 14=SOUTHERN BAPTIST, 15=OTHER BAPTIST,
18=BAPTIST-DK WHICH, 20=AFR METH EPISCOPAL, 21=AFR METH EP ZION,
22=UNITED METHODIST, 23=OTHER METHODIST, 28=METHODIST-DK
WHICH, 30=AM LUTHERAN, 31=LUTH CH IN AMERICA, 32=LUTHERAN-MO
SYNOD, 33=WI EVAN LUTH SYNOD, 34=OTHER LUTERHAN,
35=EVANGELICAL LUTH, 38=LUTHERAN-DKWHICH, 40=PRESBYTERIAN C IN
US, 41=UNITED PRES CH IN UA, 42=OTHER PRESBYTERIAN,
43=PRESBYTERIAN, MERGED, 48=PRESBYTERIAN-DK WHICH,
50=EPISCOPAL, 60=OTHER, 70=NO DEMONINATION, 0=IAP, 98=DK, 99=NA
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987,
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010,
2012
DIVBEST- dependent variable
1299. Do you agree or disagree…Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can’t
seem to work out their marriage problems.
1= STRONGLY AGREE, 2= AGREE, 3=NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, 4=
DISAGREE, 5= STRONGLY DISAGREE, 0= IAP, 8= CAN’T CHOOSE, 9=NA
1994, 2002, 2012
DIVLAW- dependent variable
215a. Should divorce in this country be easier or more difficult to obtain than it is now?
1=EASIER, 2=MORE DIFFICULT, 3=STAY SAME, 0=IAP, 8=DK, 9=NA
1974, 1975, 1976, 1977 1978, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993,
1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012
DIVNOW- dependent variable
1284. In general, would you say that the law now makes it easy or difficult for people
who want to get divorced?
1=VERY EASY, 2=FARILY EASY, 3=NEITHER, 4=FAIRLY DIFFICULT, 5=VERY
DIFFICULT, 0=IAP, 8=CANT CHOOSE, 9=NA
1988
DIVORCE- dependent variable
4b. If currently married or widowed: Have you ever been divorced or legally separated?
1=YES, 2=NO, 0=IAP, 8=DK, 9=NA
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1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987,
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010,
2012
Divorced- dependent variable
Divorced currently or ever divorced? Recoded from MARITAL and DIVORCE
0=NO, 2=EVER BEEN DIVORCED (MAY BE REMARRIED)
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987,
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010,
2012
Eighties- independent variable
Recoded from Decade, “Eighties.”
Responses from the years 1980-1989.
EightiesXATTEND- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “eighties” and “ATTEND.”
Responses from the years 1980-1989 and religious participation.
EightiesXBlackProt- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “eighties” and “Black Protestant.”
Responses from the years 1980-1989 of respondents identifying with Black
Protestantism.
EightiesXCatholicTrad- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “eighties” and “Catholic.”
Responses from the years 1980-1989 of respondents identifying with Catholicism.
EightiesXEvangelical- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “eighties” and “Evangelical Protestant.”
Responses from the years 1980-1989 of respondents identifying with Evangelical
Protestantism.
EightiesXJewishTrad- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “eighties” and “Jewish.”
Responses from the years 1980-1989 of respondents identifying with Judaism.
EightiesXOtherTrad- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “eighties” and “Other Religion.”
Responses from the years 1980-1989 of respondents identifying with other traditions.
EightiesXlthighschool- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “eighties” and “Less Than High School.”
Responses from the years 1980-1989 of respondents with less than a high school degree.
EightiesXMainlineProt- independent variable
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Recoded from combination of “eighties” and “Mainline Protestant.”
Responses from the years 1980-1989 of respondents identifying with Mainline
Protestantism.
ENCentral- independent variable
Recoded from REGION, “East North Central.”
Yes=1, no=0.
ESCentral- independent variable
Recoded from REGION, “East South Central.”
Yes=1, no=0.
Evangelical- independent variable
Recoded from Reltrad, “Evangelical Protestant.”
Yes=1, no=0.
EVDIV- dependent variable
1291. Were you ever divorced?
1=YES, 2=NO, 3-NEVER MARRIED, 0=IAP, 9=NA
1988, 1994
FECHLD- independent variable
252. Now I’m going to read several more statements. As I read each one, please tell me
whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with it. a. A working
mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother
who does not work.
1=STRONGLY AGREE, 2=AGREE, 3=DISAGREE, 4=STRONGLY DISAGREE,
0=IAP, 8=DK, 9=NA
1977, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004,
2006, 2008, 2010, 2012
FEFAM- independent variable
252. Now I’m going to read several more statements. As I read each one, please tell me
whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with it. d. It is much
better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman
takes care of the home and family.
1=STRONGLY AGREE, 2=AGREE, 3=DISAGREE, 4=STRONGLY DISAGREE,
0=IAP, 8=DK, 9=NA
1977, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004,
2006, 2008, 2010, 2012
Highschool- independent variable
Recoded from DEGREE, “High school.”
Yes=1, no=0.
INCLT60384- independent variable
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Recoded from CONINC, “Income less than 60384” in in constant 2000 dollars.
Yes=1, no=0.
INC60385to120385- independent variable
Recoded from CONINC, “Income from 60385 to 120385” in constant 2000 dollars.
Yes=1, no=0.
INC120386andup- independent variable
Recoded from CONINC, “Income from 120386 and up” in constant 2000 dollars.
Yes=1, no=0.
JewishTrad- independent variable
Recoded from Reltrad, “Jewish.”
Yes=1, no=0.
LessthanHS- independent variable
Recode from DEGREE, “Less Than High School.”
Yes=1, no=0.
Lowerworkingclass- independent variable
Recoded from CLASS, “Lower and working classes.”
Yes=1, no=0.
LT21Agewed- independent variable
Recoded from AGEWED, “Less than 21.”
Yes=1, no=0.
MainlineProt- independent variable
Recoded from Reltrad, “Mainline Protestant.”
Yes=1, n=0.
MARCOHRT- independent variable
1652. Marriage cohort of the respondent.
1900-1994
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987,
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994
MARDIV- dependent variable
1280. Do you agree or disagree? i. Couples don’t take marriage seriously enough when
divorce is easily available.
1= STRONGLY AGREE, 2= AGREE, 3=NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, 4=
DISAGREE, 5= STRONGLY DISAGREE, 0= IAP, 8= CAN’T CHOOSE, 9=NA
1988
MARFREE- independent variable
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1280. Do you agree or disagree? b. Personal freedom is more important than the
companionship of marriage
1= STRONGLY AGREE, 2= AGREE, 3=NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, 4=
DISAGREE, 5= STRONGLY DISAGREE, 0= IAP, 8= CAN’T CHOOSE, 9=NA
1988, 1996
MARITAL- dependent variable
4. Are you currently—married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been
married?
1=MARRIED, 2=WIDOWED, 3=DIVORCED, 4=SEPARATED, 5=NEVER
MARRIED, 9=NA
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987,
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010,
2012
MARNOMAR- independent variable
1280. Do you agree or disagree? e. It is better to have a bad marriage than no marriage at
all.
1= STRONGLY AGREE, 2= AGREE, 3=NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, 4=
DISAGREE, 5= STRONGLY DISAGREE, 0= IAP, 8= CAN’T CHOOSE, 9=NA
1988, 1994, 2002
MiddleAtlantic- independent variable
Recoded from REGION, “Middle Atlantic.”
Yes=1, no=0.
Middleupperclass- independent variable
Recoded from CLASS, “Middle and upper classes.”
Yes=1, no=0.
Mountain- independent variable
Recoded from REGION, “Mountain.”
Yes=1, no=0.
NewEngland- independent variable
Recoded from REGION, “New England.”
Yes=1, no=0.
Nineties- independent variable
Recoded from Decade, “Nineties.”
Responses from the years 1990-1999.
NinetiesXATTEND- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “nineties” and “ATTEND.”
Responses from the years 1990-1999 and religious participation.
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NinetiesXBlackProt- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “nineties” and “Black Protestant.”
Responses from the years 1990-1999 of respondents identifying with Black
Protestantism.
NinetiesXCatholicTrad- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “nineties” and “Catholic.”
Responses from the years 1990-1999 of respondents identifying with Catholicism.
NinetiesXEvangelical- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “nineties” and “Evangelical Protestant.”
Responses from the years 1990-1999 of respondents identifying with Evangelical
Protestantism.
NinetiesXJewishTrad- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “nineties” and “Jewish.”
Responses from the years 1990-1999 of respondents identifying with Judaism.
NinetiesXOverTrad- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “nineties” and “Other Religion.”
Responses from the years 1990-1999 of respondents identifying with other traditions.
NinetiesXlthighschool- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “nineties” and “Less Than High School.”
Responses from the years 1990-1999 of respondents with less than a high school degree.
NinetiesXMainlineProt- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “nineties” and “Mainline Protestant.”
Responses from the years 1990-1999 of respondents identifying with Mainline
Protestantism.
Northregion- independent variable
Recoded from Region, “North region” includes NewEngland, MiddleAtlantic,
ENCentral, WNCentral, Mountain, Pacific.
Yes=1, no=0.
NoTrad- independent variable
Recoded from Reltrad, “None.”
Yes=1, no=0.
Otherrace- independent variable
Recoded from RACE, “Other race.”
Yes=1, no=0
OtherTrad- independent variable
Recoded from Reltrad, “Other Religion.”
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Yes=1, no=0.
Over21Agewed- independent variable
Recoded from AGEWED, “Over 21.”
Yes=1, no=0.
Pacific- independent variable
Recoded from REGION, “Pacific.”
Yes=1, no=0.
PREMARSX- independent variable
217. There’s been a lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about sex are
changing in this country. If a man and woman have sex relations before marriage, do you
think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at
all?
1=ALWAYS WRONG, 2=ALMST ALWAYS WRONG, 3=SOMETIMES WRONG,
4=NOT WRONG AT ALL, 5=OTHER, 0=IAP, 8=DK, 9=NA
1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1978, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993,
1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012
RACE- independent variable
24. What race do you consider yourself?
1=WHITE, 2=BLACK, 3=OTHER
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987,
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010,
2012
REGION- independent variable
Region of interview
1=NEW ENGLAND, 2=MIDDLE ATLANTIC, 3=E. NOR. CENTRAL, 4=W. NOR.
CENTRAL, 5=SOUTH ATLANTIC, 6=E. SOU. CENTRAL, 7=W. SOU. CENTRAL,
8=MOUNTAIN, 9=PACIFIC
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988,
1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012
RELIG- independent variable
104. What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other
religion, or no religion?
1=PROTESTANT, 2=CATHOLIC, 3=JEWISH, 4=NONE, 5=OTHER, 6=BUDDHISM,
7=HINDUISM, 8=OTHER EASTERN, 9=MOSLEM/ISLAM, 10=ORTHODOXCHRISTIAN, 11=CHRISTIAN, 12=NATIVE AMERICAN, 13=INTERNINDENOMINATIONAL, 98=DK, 99=NA
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987,
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010,
2012
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Reltrad- independent variable
Recoded from DENOM and RELIG, “Religious tradition.”
Evangelical=1, MainlineProt=2, BlackProt=3, CatholicTrad=4, JewishTrad=5,
OtherTrad=6, NoTrad=7.
SAtlantic- independent variable
Recoded from REGION, “South Atlantic.”
Yes=1, no=0.
Seventies- independent variable
Recoded from Decade, “Seventies.”
Responses from the years 1972-1979.
SEX- independent variable
23. Code respondent’s sex
1=MALE, 2=FEMALE
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987,
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010,
2012
SomeCollege- independent variable
Recoded from DEGREE, “Some college.”
Yes=1, no=0.
Southregion- independent variable
Recoded from REGION, “South region” includes WSCentral, ESCentral, SAtlantic.
Yes=1, no=0.
Twothousands- independent variable
Recoded from Decade, “Two thousands.”
Responses from the years 2000-2012.
TwothousandsXATTEND- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “twothousands” and “ATTEND.”
Responses from the years 2000-2012 of respondents identifying with Evangelical
Protestantism.
TwothousandsXBlackProt- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “twothousands” and “Black Protestant.”
Responses from the years 2000-2012 of respondents identifying with Black
Protestantism.
TwothousandsXCatholicTrad- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “twothousands” and “Catholic.”
Responses from the years 2000-2012 of respondents identifying with Catholicism.
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TwothousandsXEvangelical- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “twothousands” and “Evangelical Protestant.”
Responses from the years 2000-2012 of respondents identifying with Evangelical
Protestantism.
TwothousandsXJewishTrad- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “twothousands” and “Jewish.”
Responses from the years 2000-2012 of respondents identifying with Judaism.
TwothousandsXOverTrad- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “twothousands” and “Other Religion.”
Responses from the years 2000-2012 of respondents identifying with other traditions.
TwothousandsXlthighschool- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “twothousands” and “Less Than High School.”
Responses from the years 2000-2012 of respondents with less than a high school degree.
TwothousandsXMainlineProt- independent variable
Recoded from combination of “twothousands” and “Mainline Protestant.”
Responses from the years 2000-2012 of respondents identifying with Mainline
Protestantism.
Whiterace- independent variable
Recoded from RACE, “White.”
Yes=1, no=0.
WNCentral- independent variable
Recoded from REGION, “West North Central.”
Yes=1, no=0.
WSCebtral- independent variable
Recoded from REGION, “West South Central.”
Yes=1, no=0.
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